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The Subtle Incentive Theory of
Copyright Licensing
Yafit Lev-Aretz†
Copyright literature has been long familiar with the lack of
licensing choices in various creative markets. In the absence of
lawful licensing alternatives, consumers of works as well as
secondary creators wishing to use protected elements of preexisting
works are often left with no choice but to either infringe on the
copyright or refrain from the use. As the dearth of licensing impedes
further creation, it greatly conflicts with the utilitarian foundation
of copyright and its constitutional goal to promote creative progress.
Legal scholarship has submitted various recommendations in
response to the licensing failure, but none of them has proved to be
effective in alleviating copyright’s licensing shortage. This article
contributes to the ongoing discourse by introducing the subtle
incentive theory of copyright licensing.
The subtle incentive theory encourages rightholders to
engage in licensing by considering the lack of licensing alternatives
in the market for a particular work as a mitigating factor in the fair
use analysis. Specifically, the subtle incentive theory propounds the
mirror image of a test that was already mandated in American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco in the mid-1990s, but which has since
been used exclusively to deny fair use. By so doing, the subtle
incentive theory mends a logical error in fair use reasoning and
promotes a better creation market by making a zero-cost doctrinal
change to ameliorate copyright licensing shortfalls. While the subtle
incentive theory avoids aggressive interference in market dynamics
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and respects rightholders’ proprietorial choices, it does not leave
the licensing failure to be repaired exclusively by the market, and
adds an important policy statement as to the significance of
original and secondary creation alike.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution grants authors an
exclusive right to their works to promote utility by encouraging
further creation.1 It is not the mere endowment of the right that
is at the root of the incentive—it is the promise of the reward.
This promise bears little economic value until the work is
demanded and an interested user is willing to remunerate the
rightholder for the use. Indeed, it is the licensing of a work2—the
agreement between a rightholder and a user to use the work in
accordance with a set of stipulated terms—that lies at the heart
of the utilitarian approach to copyright. Against this backdrop
and the large, unsatisfied demand for accessible and efficient
licensing choices, the lack of licensing possibilities in various
creative markets is puzzling and disturbing. This demand
persists in the realm of copyright, despite occasionally fluctuating
and moving between creative markets. Often, this demand is
satisfied by rightholders who recognize the economic potential of
their work.3 This is especially true for professional authors—they
may create a work and license it in return for future, agreed-upon
earnings.4 Alternatively, they may entrust a preexisting work to
those who are professionally marketing and distributing similar
works.5 Nevertheless, in some markets and for some uses, the
demand for accessible and efficient licenses has not been met.
Reasons for the undersupply vary and include rightholders’ being
unaware of possible demand for licenses, the emergence of new
markets that entail continuous market adjustments and business
adaptations that may not be financially justified from the outset,
and rightholders’ reluctance to engage in licensing for non-
economic reasons.6
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining the legislative branch’s role regarding
copyright and patent).
2 This article uses the term “license,” but refers to any legal form of authorized
use, paid or unpaid, that is based on a transaction between a rightholder and a user.
3 This article uses the term “rightholders” or “copyright holders” to refer to the
licensor and not to the licensee, who may become a rightholder under a valid license.
4 A common example of such a license is book-publishing agreements.
5 This is mainly true for the music industry, but also for book publishers.
6 For a discussion on rightholders’ anti-dissemination motives, see Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
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When a license is not readily available,7 a prospective
user will most likely find the road to licensing to be long and
discouraging. A user in such a scenario would have to identify
the rightholder, locate her, contact her, and either get a quote
for the licensing fee or reasonably negotiate a license. Copyright
divisibility, which confers upon rightholders a package of
individual rights that correspond to specific categories of use,
further complicates the process and often forces the user to obtain
multiple clearances for a single work.8 Moreover, investment in
licensing attempts is highly uncertain, because, even once the
rightholder(s) is identified, located, and reasonably negotiated
with, permission is not guaranteed due to the proprietary
entitlement of copyright, which leaves the licensing choice in
the hands of the rightholder.9
The digital age, in this respect, should be perceived as
a great promoter of licensing possibilities, as it allows both
rightholders and users to economize communication and
information costs.10 Nevertheless, the Internet and the inception of
digital technology have also motivated a growing licensing demand
by exposing additional markets for works and allowing more
people to engage in the creative process. Contrary to the early
days of the Internet, when content was provided to passive
consumers exclusively by professional contributors, users now
actively interact and collaborate with each other as creators of
Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1632-34 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure].
7 Such as when the rightholder offers her work under a creative commons
license, allowing secondary users to use the work in accordance with a set of stipulated
terms. See CREATIVECOMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
8 See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (2010);
see also Genevieve P. Rosloff, “Some Rights Reserved”: Finding the Space Between All
Rights Reserved and the Public Domain, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37, 49 (2009).
9 See infra Part IV, Pricing.
10 See Chris Forman, The Corporate Digital Divide: Determinants of Internet
Adoption, 51 MGMT. SCI., 641, 643 (2005) (“The Internet offered potentially significant
savings in communication costs between geographically despaired establishments.”).
As costs are minimized through technological means and the successful operation of
collecting societies like the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), some scholars propose
that the fair use doctrine is no longer justified solely on the grounds of reducing
transaction costs. For an example of such views, see Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared
Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine,
76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and
Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115,
130 (1997). For the opposite view, see Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s
Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 619 (2007) and Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to
Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Loren,Market Failure].
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what is known as User-Generated Content (UGC).11 Naturally, the
recently opened gate brought through not only boundless
information, but also massive copyright infringement, which
rightholders attempted to fight in various ways. On top of
traditional lobbying and litigation tactics, informal practices arose,
some of which involved licensing to ex-ante ratify infringing UGC.12
Nevertheless, the demand for licensing still exists in the UGC
market, with many Internet users in various forums and
discussions groups all repeating one pressing question: “Is there
any semi simple way to get permission?”13
A similar licensing shortage exists in orphan works. An
orphan work is a copyrighted work whose owner cannot be
identified or located to authorize a use by a potential licensee
wishing to lawfully employ the work in some productive
capacity.14 The rise of the Internet and spread of information
decreased the transaction costs previously associated with
identifying rightholders and licensing; thus the orphan works
problem, which undoubtedly existed long before the inception of
the Web, should have been dulled. But, like the effect on UGC
licensing, the digital age acts as a double-edged sword in the
orphan works context; it has cut communication and information
costs in a way that allows for more works to be licensed, but has
also created an information flood, accelerating the number of
unidentified works that cannot be legitimately used due to
insufficient licensing information.
The shortage of licensing choices has a number of adverse
consequences. Faced with no effective alternatives, users often
turn to piracy to fulfill their informational needs.15 In this respect,
piracy has not only offered free, intangible products that
otherwise required payment, but has also facilitated simpler
access to such products. In some cases, piracy has acted as a
11 Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, 45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 141-42
(2012) [hereinafter Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements].
12 See generally id. A prevailing example of such an arrangement is YouTube’s
Partners Program, which allows rightholders to monetize infringing uses via ad revenue
sharing. See infra Part II.
13 Dylan Jones, How to Get Permission to get a Song(s) in a Video?, FILMPUNCH
(May 15, 2012, 9:48 PM), http://filmpunch.org/forums/topic/how-to-get-permission-to-get-
a-songs-in-a-video/; see also How Do I Properly License Music for Use on My YouTube
Series.. ?, GOOGLE PRODUCT FORUMS, (Mar. 12, 2011), http://productforums.google.com/
forum/#!topic/youtube/v_v4C3660ro (“I just want to know what steps I should take to
make sure I’m doing this legally, and I want this to be seen as a legitimate operation.”)
(thread by the user TexmasTV).
14 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-
report-full.pdf (discussing the difficulties associated with orphan works).
15 See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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boulevard to content that was not legitimately reachable to
consume in any other way. This theory is confirmed by studies
demonstrating a significant decrease in piracy once a lawful
alternative becomes available.16 Examples of such alternatives
include digital music stores that allow users to buy a single track
as opposed to the previous choice of purchasing an entire CD;17
streaming services such as Netflix18 and Spotify,19 providing low
or no-cost, on-demand content for consumption; and licensing
services, such as YouTube’s free audioswap feature,20 Friendly
music,21 and the Vimeo music store,22 which sell tracks to be used
in UGC videos for a modest fee.
Importantly, piracy is not the only means by which
rightholders lose licensing fees. They also lose the potential
licensing revenue of those users who adhere to the law, and thus do
not turn to piracy, but who nonetheless forgo the use of the work
due to the impracticality of licensing. Further inimical to
derivative creation, the dearth of licensing choices reduces the
availability of preexisting works to secondary creators who can
either draw inspiration from the original when authoring a new
work, or build upon the original when creating a derivative. This
state runs counter to the constitutional motivation behind the
grant of copyright, as it hinders “the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”23 As several models in economic literature demonstrate that
mainstream expression enjoys better exposure and larger
investment in anticipation of a bigger market share,24 licensing
shortfalls also scale down speech diversity by reinforcing the
dominance of mainstream speech.
16 Id.
17 Danwill David Schwender, Reducing Unauthorized Digital Downloading of
Music by Obtaining Voluntary Compliance with Copyright Law Through the Removal
of Corporate Power in the Recording Industry, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 225, 254 (2012).
18 Netflix is a provider of on-demand Internet streaming media. See NETFLIX,
www.netflix.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
19 Spotify is an Internet-based music streaming service. See SPOTIFY,
www.spotify.com/us/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
20 Swap the Audio Track on Your Video, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/94316?hl=en (last visited Apr. 28, 2015) (“The audio swapping
tool allows you to add music to your video from a library of licensed songs.”).
21 Friendly Music is an online store offering a catalog of fully licensed songs for
purchase to use on UGC uploads. See FRIENDLYMUSIC, http://www.friendlymusic.com
(last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
22 Vimeo music store is a licensing music store offering free tracks under creative
commons licenses, licenses for personal Web use, and licenses for professional commercial
Web use. See VIMEO, http://vimeo.com/musicstore (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 333 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright] (citing BRUCE M. OWEN &
STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 101-50 (1992), who surveyed several models).
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Legal scholarship has already recognized the dearth of
licensing alternatives in the digital age.25 Proposals for cures can be
generally divided into two categories:26 (1) the “hands-on” approach,
supporting an aggressive intervention in the market via
compulsory licensing or levy systems, and (2) the “hands-off”
approach, relying on the invisible hand of the market to create the
necessary bypasses to the licensing failures in a way that is more
efficient than compulsory licensing systems or other forms of
intervention.27 The “hands-on” approach advocates either a
compulsory licensing scheme or a tax-and-subsidy system in which
users would be allowed to employ a copyrighted work without the
consent of the rightholder in return for a prescribed fee.28 The
“hands-off” approach suggests that high transaction costs challenge
copyright holders, who in response find ways to reduce them.29 The
argument suggests that, once the copyright entitlement is
assigned, it will be most efficiently shared through private
25 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense
of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 841-70 (2009) [hereinafter
Gervais, The Tangled Web]; Deborah Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the
Masses: A Manifesto for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921 (2009);
see generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights Without Laws?, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1197 (1998) (“Acquiring licenses to use any particular
information may involve prohibitively high transaction costs and may prevent licensing
from occurring in the first place. The high transaction costs may increase the cost of
information, and may, therefore, reduce the accessibility of informational works.”); Carl
H. Settlemyer III, Between Thought and Possession: Artists’ “Moral Rights” and Public
Access to Creative Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2324 (1993) (“In other contexts, when the
price of access to works is likely to become unreasonably high due to abusive withholding
(and high transaction costs), we have introduced both compulsory licensing schemes and
a fair use exception into our copyright system to help ensure public access”).
26 The only proposal that diverges from this sharp classification was made
recently by Peter S. Menell and Ben Depoorter, who suggest imposing litigation costs
on plaintiffs that reject reasonable license offers. See Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter,
Copyright Fee Shifting: A Proposal to Promote Fair Use and Fair Licensing, (Univ. Cal.
Berkeley Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2159325, 2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2159325. While Menell & Depoorter also
discuss the difficulties associated with clearing rights, their description of the problem,
as well as their designed solution, are focused on cumulative authors who often make
commercial and semi-commercial uses. As such, their proposed scheme is not designed
to alleviate licensing shortages in all creative fields and for all creative uses. This
solution also grants a preliminary permission to the secondary user, and by so doing
resembles a form of compulsory license. Nevertheless, and most importantly, that
proposal and the one submitted here do not conflict and can work together to fight the
licensing failure in copyright.
27 Infra Part III provides a full discussion on the two proposals, including
their merits and drawbacks.
28 EDWARD LEE LAMOUREUX ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW &
INTERACTIVEMEDIA: FREE FOR A FEE 52 (Steve Jones ed., 2009).
29 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996)
[hereinafter Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules].
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ordering: specifically by using Collective Rights Organizations
(CROs) to facilitate class licensing and copyright enforcement.30
Against the two extremes, this article proposes the subtle
incentive theory of copyright licensing—a third, middle-ground
approach to alleviate the licensing shortage in copyright. The
subtle incentive theory encourages rightholders to engage in
licensing by incorporating the existence of an accessible and
efficient licensing scheme, and a user’s bona fide attempt to
purchase a license within the fourth factor review of a fair use
defense. If an accessible and efficient licensing choice were offered
in the market for the relevant work, the fourth factor would favor
the plaintiff. Conversely, if an attempt to obtain a license failed
due to the lack of an accessible and efficient alternative, the
fourth factor would support a finding of fair use. By using the fair
use defense as its legal anchor, the subtle incentive theory
motivates licensing without depriving rightholders of their
property right or otherwise forcefully intervening in market
dynamics. Importantly, the subtle incentive theory is an example of
how, in light of the slim chances of legislative reform in the
foreseeable future, a slight doctrinal change can make a
meaningful difference in copyright effectiveness.
The fair use doctrine is based on both a non-exhaustive list
of eligible uses, including “criticism, comment, news reporting,
[and] teaching . . . , scholarship, or research,”31 and on four factors
to be considered by the court:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.32
The fourth factor, which is the focal point of the subtle incentive
theory, weighs against fair use if the use potentially harms the
market of the original work as well as the logical market for
derivative works.33
30 PAULGOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.1.1, at 10:7 & n.19 (1999) (defining CROs);
see also id. at 1295, 1328-58 (“The lesson learned in a number of industries is that
privately established Collective Rights Organizations (CROs) will often emerge to break
the transactional bottleneck.”).
31 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013).
32 Id.
33 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994); Harper &
Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
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In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,34 the Second
Circuit looked into the loss of potential licensing revenue for
markets that are “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed.”35 The decision was widely criticized for its circular
reasoning, and consequent decisions stated that the mere
offering of a license would not deem any use unfair.36 Still, the
presence of a reasonable licensing choice was regularly used to
negate a fair use treatment.37 Nonetheless, the mirror image of
this test—the unavailability of an accessible licensing choice—
hasn’t been used to support fair use until very recently. In two
cases relating to uses by non-profit educational institutions, the
fourth fair use factor was linked to the lack of actual licensing
practice; in Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker38 and in Authors
Guild Inc. v. HathiTrust,39 two district courts found that the
defendants’ uses were fair, inter alia, because appropriate
licensing solutions did not exist.
However, those decisions do not herald the full
incorporation of missing, as opposed to existing, licensing choices
into the fourth factor. They are the only two cases in a period of
over 18 years of fair use decisions to consider the lack of a licensing
alternative as an affirmative standard to support fair use.40 The
Cambridge case was successfully appealed, and while the
appellate court provided a detailed discussion as to the weight of
licensing options in a fair use analysis, the defendants were
eventually denied the defense.41 The HathiTrust case was upheld
on appeal, but the appellate court did not point to the licensing
failure as a mitigating factor in its fair use analysis.42 The cases
34 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
35 Id. at 929-30. Other cases have also used the theory of lost licensing revenue
in their fourth factor analysis. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., 99
F.3d 1381, 1387-88 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758
F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
36 See infra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
37 See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
38 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1243 (N.D. Ga.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 2014).
39 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
40 A review of all fair use cases decided since Texaco is on file with the
author. Indeed, after Texaco was decided, courts looked at the relevant market, but
none of them considered the actual licensing possibilities the defendant had at the time
before the use, especially the non-existence of a realistic licensing alternative. For
example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994), the “unlikelihood
that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own
productions” supported a finding of fair use. While in a way this statement means that
there is little chance that licensing possibilities would exist in the said market, this
statement remains general, as opposed to concrete, to the facts on the case.
41 Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014).
42 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
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are also quite factually similar: the alleged infringers are nonprofit
institutions, the uses were for educational purposes, and the works
at issue pertain to the market for texts and books.43 Consequently,
those rulings could be rightfully understood as applicable only to
uses of copyrighted texts for educational purposes within a
noncommercial setting. Moreover, those cases do not offer a clear
strategy for the inclusion of a comprehensive licensing test within
the fourth factor. The Texaco and Cambridge decisions also admit
the reasonableness of the licensing price as a new element in the
fourth factor analysis, but do so without justifying such inclusion or
illustrating its application to future cases.44
In this context, the subtle incentive theory delivers two
vital improvements: (1) it promotes a better-balanced fair use
analysis by importing a mirror image of a licensing test that was
already put forward by the Texaco court over a decade ago, and
(2) through a simple doctrinal change with zero implementation
costs, it provides a subtle incentive for rightholders to engage in
licensing. The subtle incentive theory is limited appropriately to
preclude substantial harm to rightholders’ creation incentives.
Because the subtle incentive is generated by adding a variable to
the fair use calculus, it is not determinative as to the grant of the
defense.45 The theory is also highly flexible: the rightholder who
lost a case, inter alia, because she did not engage in licensing can
change this outcome for all future cases by offering licensing
choice in the relevant market.
While the incentive is subtle, it is nevertheless still
valuable. Including the existence of licensing choices in a fair use
analysis would encourage copyright owners, especially corporate
rightholders or other repeat players, to develop licensing
alternatives. Under the subtle incentive theory, the only group of
copyright owners not expected to be motivated to develop licensing
alternatives is fairly insubstantial: rightholders for whom the cost
of licensing exceeds both the cost of lost licensing fees that could
have been otherwise paid had licensing been offered in the market,
43 All cases also discuss licensing opportunities through the CCC. See, e.g.,
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930-31; Patton, 769 F.3d at 1276-80; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at
464; Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-17, 1236-38. The same, except for the commercial
nature of the defendant, applies to the Texaco case.
44 See infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
45 Wendy Gordon noted that the Texaco court used a similar argument to
explain how physically foregone license fees can be considered without falling into
circular reasoning: “fatal circularity can be avoided by treating physically foregone license
fees as a part of the analysis rather than conclusive on fair use.” Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814, 1838
(2011) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use Markets].
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and also the costs of enlarging the pool of fair uses under the
subtle incentive theory.46 Furthermore, against the backdrop of
unlikely legislative solutions, the subtle incentive theory crowns
one policy to guide the inspiration and application of copyright
laws—a policy that appropriately compensates rightholders for the
use of their work without depriving them of their liberty to choose
whether or not to engage in licensing, while providing secondary
users a simple way to legitimately use a copyrighted work.
The article unfolds as follows. Part I describes the
continuous licensing failure in copyright creative markets and
its consequences. Part II elaborates on the existing solutions
proposed by legal commentary—the “hands-on” and “hands-off”
approaches, their vices, and their virtues. Part III introduces the
subtle incentive theory and provides some background on the
fair use doctrine, and especially the judicial development of the
fourth factor. Part IV repopulates the subtle incentive theory
and provides a list of guidelines to instruct the court on the
application of the theory in concrete fair use cases. Lastly, part
V surveys scholarly-established fair use justifications to show to
what extent the subtle incentive theory accords with current fair
use scholarship, and a conclusion follows.
I. COPYRIGHT’S LICENSING SHORTAGE
The market for copyrighted goods operates through
voluntary transactions in which the right to use informational
goods is transferred in return for some consideration. These
transfers lie at the heart of the utilitarian approach to copyright—
rightholders are encouraged to invest time and resources into
creating new works because they know that they will be paid for
the use of their works by future licensees. Throughout copyright
history, however, the demand for an accessible, simple, and
efficient licensing scheme has not always been completely
satisfied. Occasionally, lawmakers responded by initiating
statutory licensing systems to allow specific uses of copyrighted
works in return for administratively-prescribed, fair fees with no
need to obtain permission from the rightholder.47 In other cases,
market-based solutions emerged using self-help means to facilitate
46 See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
47 Compulsory licensing was first established in the 1909 Copyright Act for
purposes of musical compositions. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952) (repealed 1978); see also
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115-16, 118 (2013) (compulsory licenses for
phonorecords); id. § 118 (compulsory licenses for public broadcasting); id. § 111
(compulsory licenses for cable television).
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efficient licensing or licensing bypasses.48 The digital era has
further reduced transaction costs by enabling an unprecedented
spread of information, enhancing creation capabilities, and
providing exposure to new works. Uses that could not easily be
licensed before are now being routinely authorized and paid for
without much hassle; new licensing opportunities have opened up
for copyright holders.
Nevertheless, while occasionally fluctuating and moving
between creative markets, the demand for efficient licensing is
steadily present in copyright reality. Statutory and market-
based alternatives have failed to provide a comprehensive
answer to the licensing call; they are constantly challenged by
the rise of new technologies, new market developments, or new
licensing needs, and they require a universal system that can
adequately attend to some of the individual licensing requests.
Take, for example, a relatively new form of expression: people use
existing and emerging Internet applications to express their
creative personalities through content uploaded online known as
UGC.49 All over the world, users create and share UGC through
blogs, micro-blogging, fan-fiction and photo-sharing websites, video
platforms like YouTube, and social networks like Twitter and
Facebook. UGC varies from pure reproductions of preexisting
works and derivative versions of such works, to works that borrow
what may qualify as fair use, to original works of authorship.50 So,
despite their significant social value, UGC platforms were criticized
and sued for facilitating mass copyright infringement.51 In a
previous work I demonstrated how, concurrently with turning to
courts for help, rightholders have been cooperating with UGC
webhosts through what I termed “Second Level Agreements” in an
effort to establish a licensing bypass and monetize the new UGC
market.52 Second Level Agreements have allowed video and music
UGC platforms to prosper,53 and a similar model has also invaded
the image market recently.54
48 An example of one such efficient licensing scheme that evolved through the
market is the rise of online music stores like iTunes and Amazon. Second Level
Agreements are an example of a successful licensing bypass. Lev Aretz, Second Level
Agreements, supra note 11.
49 See generally Gervais, The Tangled Web, supra note 25, at 841-70.
50 Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, supra note 11 at 141-44.
51 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
52 Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, supra note 11, at 166-68.
53 Id.
54 The first to offer a licensing service of this sort in the image market was a
small startup named PicScout. The product offers image detection tools for monitoring
visual content that is used on the Internet as well as for helping potential users
1368 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:4
Surprisingly, discussion forums all over the Internet are
filled with users’ inquiries about licensing options for their UGC
uploads. Some users divulged their preference to purchase a
license to use the copyrighted content in their posts as a
precaution to insure them against liability.55 Others were looking
for a legal way to obtain a license, so they could clear their use
and restore a post that may have been removed or altered by the
platform.56 Users with both non-commercial and semi-commercial
intentions (e.g., small businesses) expressed their interest in
paying for a license so their material could remain online.57
Determined users who endeavored to obtain a license shared the
doom of their journey with much vexation.58 Others were
discover images that may be lawfully licensed and used. Getty Images, one of the
world’s largest stock photo agencies, acquired PicScout back in 2011, and now this tool
is offered for use to Getty’s customers. Jonathan Bailey, Getty Images Acquires
PicScout, PLAIGIARISM TODAY (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2011/04/
27/getty-images-acquires-picscout/. Getty Images also struck a deal with Pinterest, a
visual-discovery based social network, to identify exclusive Getty Images content on
Pinterest, and in return for relevant metadata, Pinterest will pay Getty Images, which
will then share the fees with images’ rightholders. See Getty Images, Getty Images
Partners with Pinterest, GETTY IMAGES BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013), http://press.gettyimages.com/
getty-images-partners-with-pinterest/.
55 For example, a post by the user FredDavenport, “How can I use music that is
legal. Doing some family and non-profit music slide shows and would be glad to pay for
the music.” YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (July 14, 2010), http://www.google.com/support/
forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=125242e9ea10050d&hl=en.
56 For example, a post by the user Little Miss FreakShow: “I love making
music videos. However, they keep getting blocked because all the music in the world
seems to be owned by WMG. I’ve tried putting notices on the details box giving credit to
owners of music that I use, but still my videos keep getting blocked. It’s very
frustrating. How do I get permission to use music on Youtube?” YAHOO ANSWERS
(2009), http://uk.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090504162600AAMfdLE.
57 See FredDavenport, supra note 55. For an example of semi-commercial
purposes, see a post by the user 1msusportsinfo: “[w]e do a lot of highlight videos and
promotional pieces for events and would like to post them on YouTube without the
music getting taken off. I am willing to buy a service, so is there anything?” YOUTUBE
HELP FORUM (Apr. 18, 2010), http://www.google.ru/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?
tid=7c94e12c14363c00&hl=en.
58 For example, a post by the user Vercingetorix:
I wanted to make a video to accompany a piece of music . . . . Soon after
uploading the video I was informed that the audio would be disabled because
I had violated copyrighted material from ‘WMG’ . . . . The disabling of the
music made the video nonsensical . . . . So, I finally decided to do something
about it by finding out who had the rights to the song and legally get
permission . . . . I searched for a couple of days and came up empty
handed . . . . The next logical step was using the ‘Contact Us’ portion of the
Warner Music Group website. . . Now each time I wanted to contact them I
had to fill in a form—I did this quite a number of times over a two-month
period and never received a response. I came across a site that said it would
contact people on your behalf to get rights to use music, movies, etc., and give
you a quote for the cost so you could legally get the rights . . . . So I regularly
contacted this company over a two-month period again having to fill in a form
each time—and I never received a response. So I have hit a brick wall and would
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discouraged from commencing action towards obtaining a license,
following advice from their experienced peers. As one frustrated
YouTube user put it: “Since I am just an individual, am I damned
to be a copyright infringer forever??? . . . Mr. Big Company,
whoever you are . . . just tell me who to call and how much
money . . . not interested in breaking the law . . . please give some
directions about how to go about it the right way.”59
Indeed, users wishing to legally employ copyrighted works
in their posts have to face many obstacles, and in many cases
realize that licensing is simply not an option for them. Acquiring
a license for UGC purposes is a long, time-consuming, and costly
course. Identifying the copyright owner may be daunting,
especially when the desired work is not a popular one. Moreover,
since copyright divisibility bestows upon copyright holders a
bundle of rights which can be monetized according to certain
categories of use,60 the user may have to locate multiple owners,
each holding one part of the total bundle.61 Even if the copyright
holder entrusts a CRO to manage her rights, the user would still
have to locate two CROs, as reproduction rights and performance
rights are managed separately.62
The ordeal would not come to a halt when the copyright
owner(s) is identified, because the next step for the user would
be to contact the rightholder to negotiate a license. An amateur
individual, with limited resources, would rarely get any
response from corporate rightholders and CROs. If the user
were lucky enough to get to the point of negotiating a license,
she could be subject to inconsistent demands by different
CROs.63 The user is also likely to be asked to pay a licensing fee
she cannot afford, especially if the requested license is for a
like to know what would be the next logical step would be in trying to get
permission to use this song? Or, at the very least, a response from a human?
YOUTUBE HELP FORUM (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/
thread?tid=48e112ea6309599c&hl=en.
59 A post by the user samanthabcarroll, GOOGLE PROD. FORUMS, (Nov. 11, 2009),
http://www.google.com/support/forum/p/youtube/thread?tid=4ea9d6fbca50a8f2&hl=en.
60 See Tanya M. Woods,Working Toward Spontaneous Copyright Licensing: A
Simple Solution for a Complex Problem, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1141, 1147 (2009).
61 Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22
U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 571 (1997); see generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the
Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003) [hereinafter Loren,
Untangling the Web].
62 SeeWoods, supra note 60, at 1147-48.
63 Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (2010)
[hereinafter Litman, Real Copyright Reform]; Loren, Untangling the Web, supra note
61, at 689-702.
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popular work.64 Copyright industries have been reluctant to
provide no-cost or reduced-price licenses for non-profit and non-
commercial uses.65 The costs of dealing with a great number of
simple transactional-licensing requests, as well as setting and
administrating a system for differential pricing, exceeds the
expected returns: thus, for corporate rightholders, perpetuating
the status quo makes more economic sense.66
Another example of the hurdles associated with licensing
can be found in the orphan works market. An orphan work is
defined by the United States Copyright Office as a “situation
where the owner of a copyrighted work cannot be identified and
located by someone who wishes to make use of the work in a
manner that requires permission of the copyright owner.”67
Works fall into orphanage for various reasons, such as
incomplete records of identifying ownership information,
uncertain publication status, uncertain authorship information
(e.g., is it a work made for hire, a joint work, public domain
materials, etc.?), and out-of-date copyright information (e.g.,
deceased author or a transfer of authorship).68
Even though most of the discussion around orphan works
involves books, the types of works likely to fall into orphanage are
those with limited commercial worth but high academic and
cultural value, like photographs, unpublished documents, letters,
and sound recordings.69 With technological advancements
increasing both exposure to original works and creation of
derivative works, the number of users affected by the orphan
works problem has escalated accordingly.70 When an orphan work
needs to be licensed, the potential licensee can either use the
64 Michal Shur-Ofry, Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Law, 59 U.
TORONTO L.J. 525, 549-52 (2009) (describing the potentials of market failure in the
process of licensing popular works).
65 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 79 (2003) [hereinafter Netanel,
Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy].
66 Id.
67 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Section I.A., supra note 14 (discussing the
difficulties associated with orphan works).
68 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COMMENTS OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS IN
RESPONSE TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE NOTICE OF INQUIRY “ORPHAN WORKS” 4-5 (2005),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0630-LOC.pdf.
69 Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book
Search and Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229, 254-35 (2011); see also JISC, IN FROM THE COLD: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE SCOPE OF ‘ORPHAN WORKS’ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DELIVERY OF
SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC 5 (2009), available at http://www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/
publications/infromthecoldv1.pdf.
70 Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding Homes
for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 274 (2006).
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work without permission—thus standing a chance of being sued
for copyright infringement—or forgo the use altogether. Some
users, especially those with limited resources, opt to avoid using
the copyrighted work.71 Surprisingly, evidence suggests that in
many cases the creators of the works, who often own the
copyright to them, might not mind their use and may appreciate
the publicity.72 While the orphan works issue has enjoyed
significant Congressional attention73 and is widely discussed in
legal commentary,74 a solution has yet to materialize.
The difficulties associated with clearing copyrighted
images for online and offline uses offer a good illustration of
the orphan works issue. For instance, consumers might
encounter significant complications when attempting to obtain
a license to reproduce old portraits shot by studios that are no
longer in business or whose photographers are deceased.75
Although the Professional Photographers of America (PPA)
assists with identifying and locating the relevant rightholder,
given the massive number of copyrighted images in circulation,
finding the copyright owner is often a difficult and sometimes
impossible mission.76
The lack of an efficient licensing solution harms both
rightholders and prospective authors in a few ways. First, the
lack of a lawful licensing alternative is conducive to the initiation
and maintenance of piracy. For instance, the astonishing turn to
illegal file sharing in its early days was attributed, inter alia, to
the recording industry’s tardy acceptance of online distribution
models.77 Presented with the choice of either purchasing and
uploading an entire CD to play a specific music track, or simply
71 De la Durantaye, supra note 69, at 235 (noting that “[i]n the over 850
submissions made to the U.S. Copyright Office following its Notice of Inquiry regarding
the orphan works problem, especially not-for-profit organizations recount instances in
which they shied away from digitizing and preserving copyrighted works of which the
owners cannot be identified and located”).
72 Id.
73 The Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, § 2913, 110th Cong. (2008)
and the Orphan Works Act of 2008, HR 5889, 110th Cong. (2008) were introduced as
potential answers, but failed to pass.
74 See, e.g., Huang, supra note 70; Maria A. Pallante, Orphan Works and Mass
Digitization: Obstacles & opportunities, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1251 (2012); Keith
Porcaro, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope? 2010 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 15 (2010); Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012); Sami J. Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic
Model for the Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in
Support of the Orphan Works Act, 29 HASTINGSCOMM. & ENT. L. J. 359 (2007).
75 Jeremiah A. Armstrong, The Digital Era of Photography Requires
Streamlined Licensing and Rights Management, 47 SANTACLARA L. REV. 785, 817 (2007).
76 Id.
77 Schwender, supra note 17, at 25.
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downloading the desired recording from a file-sharing service,
many consumers opted for the less burdensome choice.78 Since its
introduction by Apple in 2003, iTunes has been celebrated as a
major revenue generator for rightholders of musical content.79
Similarly, a recent study found that illegal music file sharing
declined significantly in 2012, with 40% of American Internet
users who had illegally downloaded music in 2011 reporting that
they had stopped or consumed less illegal content.80 According to
the same study, the main cause for the decrease in illegal
sharing was a growing use of legal streaming alternatives.81
Another study affirmed that legal media services can displace
piracy: 30% of surveyed music consumers and 40% of TV/movies
consumers conceded that the emergence of low-cost legal
streaming alternatives has reduced their piracy activities.82
Piracy has not only been a way to avoid paying for
copyrighted content, it has also been a hassle-free route to access,
consume, and use copyrighted materials. When an appropriate
lawful choice was offered, piracy numbers went down and many
selected the lawful choice. Several examples demonstrate the
drop in piracy when an efficient licensing choice exists, such as
the rise of online music stores, the introduction of streaming
services, (e.g., Spotify and Netflix that provide an effortless way
to find and consume content), and the successful launch of
Friendly Music, the first music store to license tracks for use in
user-created videos.83
78 Id. at 254; see also Eric Berger, The Legal Problems of the MP3, 18 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 19 (1999) (“If the RIAA can find a way to offer its product for a
reasonable price, the RIAA would likely see a sharp decline in the popularity of illegal
MP3s. While cheap is more expensive than free, and piracy will always exist in some
form, most consumers, even those who partake in the piracy, would like to do what is
legal. However, right now there is not much legal competition.”).
79 iTunes Store Sets New Record with 25 Billion Songs Sold, APPLE PRESS
INFO (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2013/02/06iTunes-Store-Sets-New-
Record-with-25-Billion-Songs-Sold.html.




82 AM. ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIV., COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT IN THE US: A RESEARCH NOTE 2 (Nov. 2011), available at
http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-Note-
Infringement-and-Enforcement-November-2011.pdf.
83 Friendly Music is a licensing service owned by Rumblefish and endorsed by
YouTube. FRIENDLYMUSIC, supra note 21. In an interview I conducted with Paul Anthony,
Rumblefish’s CEO, Mr. Anthony talked about the great demand for noncommercial and
semi-commercial licensing—a demand that has only begun to be satisfied by the 6 million
licenses sold within Friendly Music’s first year of operation. Telephone Interview with Paul
Anthony, CEO, Rumblefish (Sept. 2, 2012) (notes on file with the author).
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In addition to contributing to the mushrooming of piracy,
the absence of an efficient licensing choice eliminates a major
revenue stream for owners of copyrighted works. When users are
willing to pay but do not negotiate with rightholders because the
path to negotiation is too time-consuming or otherwise costly,
rightholders lose potential licensing fees. Furthermore, in
many cases legitimate derivative works increase the economic
value of the original work by offering additional exposure to
interested buyers.84
The lack of licensing alternatives has also been
detrimental to further creation. The harm can be described as
both indirect and direct disservice. The indirect loss takes place
on the consumption level, where the lack of efficient licensing—
assuming it does not drive one to utilize an illegal alternative—
inhibits access to various works of authorship that otherwise
would have been consumed. To illustrate this point, consider
again the height of music file-sharing: if one wished to enjoy a
certain musical track that could not be obtained legally, and this
person insisted on refraining from illegally downloading the
content from a peer-to-peer service where it was readily available,
there was no way for her to consume the desired recording.85
Content consumption, due to its importance, should not be
undermined—it provides social exposure to a wider spectrum of
cultural and educational goods. Furthermore, as copyright law
recognizes,86 because authors inherently draw on preexisting works
for inspiration and to create derivative versions, consumption of
copyrighted content encourages subsequent creation.87
Further creation is also being directly impeded: in the
absence of a workable licensing choice, prospective producers
84 Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
567, 596 (2006) (giving an example of three novels that borrowed some elements from
preexisting works, and pointing out that “in each of these three examples, the
Amazon.com website, which makes all of these works available for purchase, advertises
that customers who purchased the more recent work also purchased the original work.
Moreover, in two of these three examples, Amazon.com encourages purchase of the
original work as well as the more recent work by offering a discount to purchasers who
buy both books at the same time”).
85 Similarly, if the rightholder chooses not to license to streaming services
like Netflix and Amazon, without brick and mortar stores to obtain physical copies of
movies, consumers are left with no viable alternative.
86 While copyright does not confer the right to create derivatives on secondary
users, the importance of a (paid) use of preexisting works is embodied in the Constitutional
goal: the “Promot[ion] of Science and Useful Arts” is done by remunerating earlier creators.
Remuneration, however, is achieved through licensing the work for consumption by
consumers and for use by secondary users. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:14 (1989)
(“If copyright law is to promote the national culture and learning, it must allow
subsequent creators to draw on copyrighted works for their inspiration and education.”).
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wishing to integrate or build upon an author’s work are prohibited
from lawfully doing so because they cannot reimburse the author
for the right. An efficient transfer or license of copyright, which is
hindered by a market failure, is objectionable for economic and
policy considerations. It also contradicts the primary motivation
behind U.S. copyright law as set forth by the U.S. Constitution:
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”88 When an
efficient licensing choice exists, it fosters the generation and
distribution of creative works that otherwise might not be
created, while its absence impedes the production of new works
and limits expression.
Finally, the lack of licensing choices can also harm speech
diversity. According to several models in economic literature,
publishing companies, motion picture studios, and other media
firms demonstrate an inherent bias favoring mainstream
expression that is expected to attract large audiences while
disfavoring minority taste.89 The growth of corporate rightholders,
which capture great shares in the copyright market, has intensified
the problem of homogenous expression culture.90 This problem has
been considerably attenuated due to the immense exposure
provided by the rise of UGC, which allows myriad expressions to be
consumed by everyone without sifting by media conglomerates. But
without a proper licensing scheme, many of these expressions
constitute copyright infringement. Often, the secondary author in
such cases would prefer to avoid the risk of having her post
removed or being exposed to legal liability and would not make
her work available. Even if the author risks liability and chooses
to post her work online, there is a chance the work would be
removed by the hosting platform, which may not be willing to face
the possibility of a secondary liability lawsuit.91 Hence, the lack of
an efficient licensing solution contributes to the problem of
homogenous expression culture by limiting the positive exposure
effect of UGC to cases of original content or content that is
otherwise permitted under an informal practice.
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
89 Netanel, Copyright, supra note 24, at 333.
90 Id. (citing Diana Crane, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE: MEDIA AND THE
URBAN ARTS 55-75 (1992)); BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 3-26 (1992);
Paul DiMaggio, Market Structure, the Creative Process, and Popular Culture: Toward
an Organizational Reinterpretation of Mass-Culture Theory, 11 J. POPULAR CULTURE
436, 440 (1977).
91 Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, supra note 11, at 144-49.
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II. SCHOLARLY-PRESCRIBED SOLUTIONS: A “HANDS-ON”
APPROACH V. A “HANDS-OFF” APPROACH
Licensing difficulties have already been recognized in
different creation fields, and scholars have attempted to identify
the roots of the copyright system’s incapacity to offer a useful
licensing mechanism.92 The explanation is quite simple: since its
inception in 1710, copyrights were traded through licenses or
assignments among professionals.93 Copyright owners traditionally
only granted licenses to professional users, and commissioned
CROs to handle licensing when a large selection of works was
owned by a plurality of owners.94 Since personal employment of
copyrighted content had little commercial value, copyright law did
not apply, at least practically, to cases of individual uses within
the privacy of one’s home.95 During the past 16 years, copyright
owners have concerned themselves with individual consumers
and end users, but the law has not changed to reflect the new
authorship capabilities and creation reality.96
Legal scholarship has proposed various solutions to the
described licensing shortage. The existing proposals can be
divided into two main schools: (1) the “hands-on” approach, which
advocates for aggressive governmental intervention through a
statutory licensing regime or a levy system, and (2) the “hands-
off” approach, which favors the invisible hand of the market as
the preferred regulator with minimal to zero governmental
intervention.97 In the next subsections I briefly survey these two
schools and discuss their merits and drawbacks.
92 See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37-52 (2001); Gervais, The
Tangled Web supra note 25, at 841-70, Halbert, supra note 25.
93 Gervais, The Tangled Web, supra note 25, at 846-47.
94 Id. at 848.
95 Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1873-74 (2007)
(“Fifty years ago, copyright law rarely concerned itself with uses that were not both
commercial and public.”).
96 Gervais, The Tangled Web, supra note 25, at 846-47.
97 Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand argues that economic and social
efficiency is maximized when individuals act in their own self-interest. ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 126 (J.R.
M’Culloch ed., Adam & Charles Black 1863) (1776).
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A. A “Hands-On” Approach
1. Compulsory Licensing Models
The compulsory licensing model is not new to U.S.
copyright law,98 and some of its versions are considered
successful.99 In general, a compulsory license is a form of unwritten
contract, permitting a class of users to use a copyrighted work in
return for the payment of a fee or royalty at some later date.100
Under such a mechanism, the license must be granted to the class
of users who meet the statutory requirements, and a rightholder
can neither deny a use nor set her wished-for price.101 In other
words, by establishing compulsory licensing systems, the
government converts the property rule entitlement of copyright to
a liability rule based on the principle of “take now, pay later.”102
Previous resorts to compulsory licensing regimes were justified as
a response to the emergence of new technology, which
concurrently interfered with an exclusive right and introduced
new social utility considerations.103
When a compulsory licensing model is prescribed,
Congress acknowledges that, for a specific use of a protected
work, the conventional copyright allocation does not appropriately
effectuate copyright social utility objectives.104 To remedy this
inadequacy, Congress attempts to restore the proper balance
between authors and the public by allowing the latter to use the
work in accordance with the statutory licensing terms while
securing compensation for rightholders.105 Legislatively mandated
licensing lowers transaction costs in two ways: first, contractual
stipulations are established in advance, hence reducing negotiation
costs;106 second, administrative support is built into the statute, so
98 See supra note 47.
99 For example, the effectiveness of mechanical licensing has given rise to
proposals of similar statutory regimes for music sampling. See, e.g., Aaron Power, 15
Megabytes of Fame: A Fair Use Defense for Mash-Ups as DJ Culture Reaches its
Postmodern Limit, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 577, 596 (2007).
100 Midge M. Hyman, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use of
Compulsory Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS&ENT. L.J. 105, 107 (1985).
101 Id.
102 Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPs and
Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93, 107 (2000).
103 Lateef Mtima & Steven D. Jamar, Fulfilling the Copyright Social Justice
Promise: Digitizing Textual Information, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 77, 104 (2010).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 103.
106 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1295.
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compulsory licensing allows parties to economize on record
keeping, royalty distribution, and payment charging.107
Legal scholars have called for the initiation of either a
compulsory licensing system or a similar tax-and-subsidy
scheme in which users would be allowed to employ a copyrighted
work in return for a fixed royalty.108 Proponents of both of these
proposals are concerned that enforcement struggles are withering
the justifications behind the existing entitlement structure, and
desire to make the most of the improved dissemination
opportunities afforded by digital advancements.109 Recent
proposals generally pertain to specific licensing contexts, most of
which involve digital technology uses such as the consumption of
music and motion pictures via file sharing,110 sampling music
and mashups,111 and online transmissions.112 For example, Neil
Netanel offered a model of a noncommercial use levy administrated
by the Copyright Office and carried out by taxing goods that are
boosted in value by file sharing (like MP3 players).113 William
Fisher recommended an administrative compensation system run
by the Copyright Office, under which a tax collected on devices and
services would be used to pay rightholders in proportion to the
consumption of their content.114 Lawrence Lessig, who predicted
that file sharing would yield to streaming technology, supported
Fisher’s proposal as a transient solution, which would have to
107 Id.
108 LAMOUREUX, supra note 28, at 52.
109 Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 126 (2004).
110 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258 (2004) [hereinafter FISHER, PROMISES TO
KEEP]; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852-58 (2001);
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 65, at 37-59; Raymond Shih
Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of
Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 312-15 (2002).
111 See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical
Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 635-41 (2006);
Thomas P. Wolf, Toward a “New School” Licensing Regime for Digital Sampling:
Disclosure, Coding, and Click-Through, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011).
112 R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing
Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 268-73 (2001)
(suggesting to extend current compulsory licenses to temporary RAM storage incidental
to licensed or exempt uses).
113 Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 65, at 35-59.
114 FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP, supra note 110, at 9-10, 199-258. While the
initial deployment of Terry Fisher’s system was proposed to be voluntary, it was
expected to later replace the current copyright law system with a compulsory scheme.
See also Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 33
(2004) [hereinafter Litman, Sharing and Stealing].
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change accordingly in the future.115 The Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) proposed a compulsory licensing model with
an opt-in choice for consumers—rather than imposing taxes,
users would be offered to pay a flat fee in return for unlimited
downloading of content and immunity for their actions.116
Many supporting arguments bolster the use of
compulsory licensing systems to solve current licensing
difficulties. The establishment of compulsory licenses has been
traditionally justified in cases when technology has made old
licensing methods for established rights ponderous and
inefficient.117 The rise of digital technology rendered existing
licensing models unfit for the mass of creative users wishing to
employ copyrighted materials, and thus, intervening in the
market failure through compulsory licensing mechanisms seems
adequate. By removing the difficulties involved in identifying
and locating rightholders, bargaining over licensing fees, and
transferring assets, compulsory licenses lessen transaction costs
and allow many transfers that would not otherwise occur.118 This
way, rightholders would be remunerated for the use of their
work, without having to manage abundant licensing requests
with potential pricing differences. While it is possible, perhaps
even likely, that the ceiling price provided by a compulsory
license regime would be lower than an individually negotiated
price for each use, the costs associated with such individualized
negotiations often prevent them from coming about.119 So
rightholders under a compulsory license regime might receive
less compensation per use, but could potentially profit more
overall from the increased number of license transfers.
A compulsory licensing scheme would also be beneficial to
users; it would encourage new expression by allowing secondary
authors to legally consume content and to employ protected
materials in their works. Lawrence Lessig’s articulated remorse
for the industry’s persistent rejection of the file sharing
compulsory licensing model successfully captures this advantage:
115 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCKDOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 298-304 (2004).
116 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., A BETTERWAY FORWARD: VOLUNTARY COLLECTIVE
LICENSING OF MUSIC FILE SHARING (Feb. 2004), available at https://www.eff.org/
files/collective_lic_wp.pdf.
117 Robert Stephen Lee, An Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in
Copyright Law, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 203, 209 (1982).
118 Helfer, supra note 102, at 107.
119 Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 65, at 79.
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[h]ad businesses been free to rely upon these licenses, there would
have been an explosion in innovation around these technologies . . . .
Anyone who had an idea could have deployed it, consistent with the terms
of the compulsory license. Thus, innovation in content distribution would
have been greater too.120
Another desirable byproduct of the compulsory licensing
model is the educational message it conveys. When users (or
society as a whole) are required to pay for the use of information,
the notion that copyright has its price is communicated. Finally,
a compulsory license regime was also praised for harmonizing
U.S. copyright law with the law of other foreign countries, like
Canada and Germany.121
Despite these benefits, compulsory licensing involves
many difficulties long recognized by legal commentary.122 Critics
have argued that by replacing copyright’s traditional property
rule protection with liability rules, the government expropriates
property rights without cause and interferes unduly with market
mechanisms.123 Under existing copyright law, copyright holders
have an exclusive right to decide how to release their works, and
they should not be forced to act against their wishes.124 Critics
also argued that such intervention prevents the development of
market-based alternatives, which could make the licensing
process more efficient.125 Compulsory licenses also influence
investments in the production, development, and marketing of
creative works.126 By placing an artificial ceiling on the amount
that can be paid for a work, compulsory license regimes reduce
differentiation among works produced; no work will attract
120 LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY 111 (2008) [hereinafter LESSIG, REMIX].
121 Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
653, 708 (2005).
122 Commentators have doubted the value and operation of compulsory
licenses. See E. Fulton Brylawski, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 24 UCLA L. REV.
1265, 1272 (1977); Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses—Are They Coming
or Going?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 231, 231-32 (1989); Frederick F. Greenman, Jr. &
Alvin Deutsch, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the Statutory Mechanical Royalty:
History and Prospect, 1 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4, 9 (1982); Hyman, supra note
100; Lee, supra note 117, at 209; Scott M. Martin, The Berne Convention and the U.S.
Compulsory License for Jukeboxes: Why the Song Could Not Remain the Same, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 262, 265-66 (1990); Bruce Schaffer, Are the Compulsory License
Provisions of the Copyright Law Unconstitutional?, 2 COMM. & L. 1 (1980).
123 Ashlye M. Keaton & Jerry Goolsby, In the Trenches of Copyright Law:
Challenges and Remedies, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 211, 219 (2009).
124 Yu, supra note 121, at 712.
125 Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and
Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLAL. REV. 1107, 1139 (1977).
126 Id. at 1135.
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investment that exceeds the compulsory licensing ceiling price.127
Also, given the personal nature of many creative acts, the
diminution in authorial control without ensuring sufficient
recognition of the personality rights of the artist was criticized for
discouraging creation.128 Critics further argued that compulsory
licenses extended the copyright monopoly beyond the constitutional
scope set forth in the Copyright Clause and Supreme Court rulings
because the licenses cannot distinguish non-copyrightable
components from copyrightable components.129
Likewise, flat rate pricing schemes fail to differentiate
between derivative uses varying in quantitative size and
qualitative importance.130 The flat rate associated with
compulsory licensing models also negates rightholders’ ability to
participate in price discrimination—a practice that may augment
social welfare by adding to the owner’s income and by allowing
more people to engage in the market of creation.131 Moreover, a
legislated royalty “floor” often becomes a “ceiling” under a
compulsory licensing scheme.132 A compulsory license model also
triggers a cross-subsidization problem: when low-volume users are
charged similar rates as high-volume users, the low-volume users
subsidize high-volume users.133
Opponents of the compulsory licensing scheme have also
pointed to the numerous practical impediments associated with
the initiation of a compulsory licensing system as a sufficient
reason to abandon such attempts:134 the implementation of a tax-
127 Id.; see also Jason S. Rooks, Note, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed
Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Infringement Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 271-72 (1995).
128 Doris Estelle Long, Dissonant Harmonization: Limitations on “Cash n’
Carry” Creativity, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1163, 1193 (2007).
129 Rooks, supra note 127, at 272.
130 For a similar argument regarding music sampling, see Wolf, supra note
111, at 13.
131 William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1417, 1449 (2010).
132 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1304-06,
1310-11, 1391-92.
133 Yu, supra note 121, at 709-10; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1643-44
(2001). Some commentators argued that the cross-subsidization problem is overstated,
because many low-volume users would be happy to pay for unlimited file sharing even
if they do not actually download much content. Furthermore, the easy legal access to
downloadable content could motivate some low-volume users to become high-volume
users. See Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 65, at 67-74; see also
Peter Eckersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital
Copyright?, 18 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 107 (2004).
134 J. Wesley Cochran, Why Can’t I Watch This Video Here?: Copyright
Confusion and Performances of Videocassettes & Videodiscs in Libraries, 15 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L. J. 837, 888-90 (1993).
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based system would likely generate public protest;135 the need to
monitor usage to ensure correct allocation of the collected funds to
rightholders raises privacy concerns;136 the costs of maintaining
an accurate tracking system could also prove expensive, thus
rightholders may wind up underpaid.137 It was also argued that
the difficulty to set up an appropriate protocol for dividing the
royalty pool and the inability of the licensing system to generate
sufficient funds to compensate rightholders could hinder the
establishment of any compulsory licensing scheme.138 Most
importantly, the initiation of a statutory licensing regime requires
legislative action, which has never been easy to complete for
copyright issues, and is even harder to accomplish today in light
of the complicated politics of copyright.139
A decade after the first compulsory licensing proposals
were proposed to address the file-sharing problem, we now enjoy
the benefit of hindsight. Even though many of the disadvantages
delineated above could be solved, and despite the fact that the
compulsory licensing proposals could actually improve copyright
law and practice for all involved parties, none of them have
gained any traction.140 Major copyright legislation, like that
required to implement additional compulsory licenses, normally
takes years, even decades, to enact. And even though the file
sharing discussion remains highly relevant today, none of the
proposals have made it to Congress. The content industry
repudiated all proposals for a compulsory licensing regime insofar
as file sharing is concerned,141 and as Pamela Samuelson noted,
“Copyright industry groups . . . often write the laws that the
legislature enacts.”142 Indeed, past legislative changes have
produced the public perception that copyright law is compelled
135 Jessica Wang, A Brave New Step: Why the Music Industry Should Follow
the Hulu Model, 51 IDEA 511, 532 (2011).
136 Steven Masur, Collective Rights Licensing for Internet Downloads and Streams:
Would it Properly Compensate Rights Holders?, 18VILL. SPORTS&ENT. L.J. 39, 41 (2011).
137 Ginsburg, supra note 133, at 1643-44.
138 Yu, supra note 121, at 708-12.
139 See generally Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice:
From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 203 (2013).
140 LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 120, at 109-10.
141 Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 114, at 34-35.
142 Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and
Policy?, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 3, 7 (2004); see also Jessica D. Litman, Copyright
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) [hereinafter Litman on
Copyright Legislation] (“The history of copyright revision efforts during the first half of this
century demonstrates how a process of private negotiations, initially adopted as an
expedient alternative to a government commission, came to dominate copyright revision.”).
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and controlled by lobbying and political interest group pressure
on behalf of the entertainment industry.143
2. Voluntary Licensing Models
Another less extreme form of the “hands-on” approach
can be found in proposals to initiate voluntary licensing models.
Under a voluntary licensing system, users pay for the use of
content, but instead of obtaining a license from each right
owner, they buy one from collection societies. These societies
aggregate copyrighted works and administer the collection and
distribution of royalties.144 In the twentieth century, a similar
system was used with much success for broadcast radio.145
Proponents of the voluntary collective licensing model usually
point to existing CROs like ASCAP,146 BMI,147 and SESAC148 as
the appropriate “checkpoint” to transfer revenue from a
multiplicity of users to a multiplicity of copyright holders.149
CROs’ business is precisely to deal with large amounts of users,
usage data, and rightholders150 by offering users quick and easy
one-stop shops for purchasing licenses.151 CROs are also in a
better position to locate potential users, negotiate with them, and
enforce rights.152 Thus, allowing CROs to license authorization to
use works can be more efficient than individual negotiations and
licensing for both copyright owners and users.153
In the context of file sharing, Jessica Litman proposed a
statutory, voluntary licensing model, under which file sharing
would be subject to a blanket license with prescribed terms.154 A
government agency, together with designated licensing agents,
143 Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Blacklash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1290 (2011).
144 Jared S. Welsh, Pay What You Like—No, Really: Why Copyright Law Should
Make Digital Music Free for Noncommercial Uses, 58 EMORY L.J. 1495, 1528 (2009).
145 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 116, at 2.
146 American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers.
147 Broadcast Music Inc.
148 The Society of European Stage Authors and Performers.
149 Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Licensing Regime
for File-Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 59-60 (2004) [hereinafter Gervais, The Price
of Social Norms].
150 Id. at 61-62; see also Daniel Gervais, Collective Management and Copyright:
Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, in COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND
RELATED RIGHTS 1, 1-3, 15-18 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2010) [hereinafter Gervais, Collective
Management and Copyright].
151 Séverine Dusollier & Caroline Colin, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and




154 Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 114, at 41-42.
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would administrate the collection and distribution of funds.155
Litman basically offered to build “a music space that resembles
the current digital information space in the ubiquity of music it
contains and the ease with which music may be shared.”156
Importantly, contrary to compulsory licensing proposals, copyright
holders under the voluntary regime would have the right to opt
out. By choosing to either allow their works to be used for some
financial return or to offer them under a digital rights
management-protected format, rightholders would be able to
control distribution of their materials.157
The voluntary approach is preferred, according to
Litman, because once the legal and technological environment
adapts to file sharing, allowing rightholders not to engage in the
system would do little harm.158 Moreover, there is little sense in
forcing creators who choose the current system, despite how
badly it has served them, to engage in an improved system if the
latter can be successful without their cooperation.159 Litman also
conceded that under such a system, the compensation of major
rightholders would probably be very high as opposed to owners
of less successful music, who would probably suffer
underpayment.160 Voluntary licensing is also less likely to
abrogate U.S. international commitments under the Berne
Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.161
Alexander Peukert, a German legal scholar, has proposed
a parallel system to Litman’s voluntary regime.162 Under Peukert’s
proposed system, the default rule bestows upon rightholders the
exclusive right to enforce their copyright and allows them to opt in
to a levy-based system set up by the government.163 Daniel Gervais
also advocated for a voluntary licensing system to legalize file
sharing. Gervais’ model essentially proposed charging users with
monthly fees which would be brokered by intermediaries like ISPs,
copyright collectives, technology companies, or some combination
of those entities.164 In an earlier proposal submitted to the
Canadian government, Gervais suggested an extended collective
155 Id. at 42.
156 Id. at 40.
157 Id. at 41.
158 Id. at 45.
159 Id. at 46.
160 Id. at 45.
161 Id. at 45-46.
162 Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network
Environment, in PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING AND SECONDARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT
LAW (Alain Strowell ed., 2009) at 148-95.
163 Id. at 191.
164 Gervais, The Price of Social Norms, supra note 149, at 60-63.
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licensing model in which copyright owners would, by default, be
enrolled in the system, but would have the choice to opt out.165
The voluntary licensing models offer some notable
benefits. First, they are based on mutual agreement and do not
impose themselves on the affected parties. Most of the voluntary
licensing proposals introduce new business models to be
implemented upon minor modifications to the existing legal
framework, thus guaranteeing a more efficient, less costly, and
quicker implementation than the one expected for a compulsory
licensing regime.166 A voluntary system also allows copyright
owners to retain strong control over the licensing of their creative
works, in compliance with copyright’s proprietary essence. The
voluntary licensing models share some of the advantages offered
by the compulsory licensing models; users could create legally,
rightholders could access a potential revenue generator, and free
expression would be encouraged and augmented.
These models, however, also share some of the difficulties
associated with compulsory licensing schemes. The potential for
undercompensating rightholders is said to be greater under a
voluntary regime.167 A system without a legally binding obligation
to pay for the use could make the compensation lower than
necessary to preserve an incentive to create.168 Assuming that
users would volunteer to pay for content they can freely obtain
through file sharing was criticized for overestimating people’s
generosity.169 The system is also susceptible to free riding users
who could opt out but still enjoy its benefits at the expense of
those who choose to pay.170 Moreover, such a system may falsely
teach users that paying for music or copyrighted content is
relative to an individual’s choice.171 The cross-subsidization
problem is also likely to arise here because users are charged the
same even though their consuming value may differ.172 Practical
difficulties, like how to divide the collected licensing fees, were
165 DANIEL GERVAIS, APPLICATION OF AN EXTENDED COLLECTIVE LICENSING
REGIME IN CANADA: PRINCIPLES AND ISSUES RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION (2003),
available at http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~dgervais/publications/extended_licensing.pdf.
166 ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 116.
167 Joel C. Boehm, Copyright Reform for the Digital Era: Protecting the Future
of Recorded Music Through Compulsory Licensing and Proper Judicial Analysis, 10
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 169, 199-200 (2009).
168 Id.
169 Alvin Chan, The Chronicles of Grokster: Who is the Biggest Threat in the
P2P Battle?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 291, 321 (2008). This argument, however, is not
entirely persuasive in the face of successful low-fee services like Netflix and Spotify.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Yu, supra note 121, at 715.
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also cited as potential obstructions of a voluntary system.173
Administrated by CROs, the voluntary licensing schemes may
also favor larger, mainstream content owners and be subject to
strong influence by major corporations.174 The greatest hurdle of
all, however, rests in the model’s greatest benefit—its voluntary
nature. The voluntary system could be successful only if a
sufficient number of copyright owners (and in some proposals—a
vast amount of users) agree to engage. In the present
environment, garnering the approval from all copyright holders
within a reasonable period of time may prove to be impossible.175
B. A “Hands-Off” Approach
The invisible hand approach to the licensing failure
argues that, when challenged by high transaction costs,
copyright holders will find efficient ways to reduce them. Under
this view, copyright law prescribes the sphere of the entitlement,
and once the entitlement is assigned, it will be efficiently shared
out through private ordering.176 Specifically, rightholders would
entrust the administration of their property rights to private
CROs that facilitate class licensing and copyright enforcement.177
CROs are said to be able to significantly reduce transaction costs
associated with licensing by offering a homogenous licensing
menu, combining enforcement power, and setting a blueprint for
royalty distributions.178
Robert Merges, who is most often identified with the
“hands-off” approach, has recognized the incentive of industry
participants to invest in institutions like CROs to reduce the
173 Id.
174 Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 114, at 43; see also Welsh, supra
note 144, at 1529.
175 Litman, Sharing and Stealing, supra note 114, at 34-38 (noting that
previous proposals for copyright reforms that would allow licensed peer-to-peer file
sharing were spurned by the recording and motion picture industry).
176 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 18 (1959) (“[T]he allocation of resources should be determined by the forces of
the market rather than as a result of government decisions.”); Paul Goldstein, Copyright,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 82-83 (1992) (maintaining that entitlement allocation is
conducted better by market forces); Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note
29, at 1301-07 (demonstrating how private ordering is more efficient in allocating the
property entitlement than compulsory licensing regime).
177 PAULGOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.1.1, at 10:7 & n.19 (2d ed. Supp. 1999); see
alsoMerges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1295 (“The lesson learned
in a number of industries is that privately established Collective Rights Organizations
(CROs) will often emerge to break the transactional bottleneck.”).
178 Helfer, supra note 102, at 108.
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costs of the intellectual property rights (IPR) exchange.179
Coupled with strong property rules for intellectual property
owners, the market then can best stimulate private bargaining
that acts much like a statutory liability rule without needing to
turn to compulsory licenses.180 According to Merges, those private
licensing engagements are more desirable than compulsory
licenses for two main reasons.181 First, compulsory licensing
models suffer from political economy problems, such as rent
seeking by both rightholders and users over the initial design of
the licensing system as well as later modifications that may be
required by changes in the market.182 Second, IPR transfers are
conducted more efficiently through CROs, as the agreements are
generally more flexible than compulsory licensing mechanisms.183
When fixing the royalty rate, CROs can get more direct feedback
from industry participants to offer a compensation structure that
is consistent with their needs.184 To put the point slightly
differently, the rules set by CROs are “the product of internal
negotiations by knowledgeable people in the industry.”185 And so,
even though CROs cannot perfectly substitute for comprehensive
negotiations between individuals, the rules of exchange they
hatch succeed better than compulsory licenses at resembling
market bargains.186 The flexibility of this model also permits price
discrimination and retains differentiation among works produced.
The invisible hand approach avoids many of the problems
associated with the compulsory licensing strategy. As it requires
no legislative action, it evades rent-seeking problems, saves
lobbying costs, and is amenable to market changes.187 Furthermore,
the hands-off perspective does not involve substituting the long-
standing property rules of copyright with liability rules—a step at
the heart of a long-lasting debate188 which, aside from its potential
179 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1295; see also
Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) [hereinafter Merges, of Property Rules].
180 Merges, of Property Rules, supra note 179.
181 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1314-15
(“[W]hen private contracts or institutions are a viable alternative, bargaining should be
channeled out of the legislative arena.”).
182 Id. at 1299 (“[I]f past experience with compulsory licenses is any guide, the
royalty rates might well become ‘locked in,’ and therefore subject to only very modest
changes over time.”).
183 Id.
184 Id.; see also Helfer, supra note 102, at 192.
185 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1300.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1299.
188 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029-36 (1995); Guido
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virtues and vices, would be extremely difficult to complete in
today’s complicated copyright politics. The “hands-off” strategy
also allows the market to develop better licensing alternatives
and encourages the most efficient pricing model, since the
payment rate is determined by industry players or by an
organization that closely interacts with such players.
This proposal, however, has its own share of difficulties.
First, it upholds a status quo in the market while awaiting a
market-based solution. The market may, or may not, come up
with a better way out, and by the time a definite response has
taken place, a great amount of expression could be frustrated.
It is not clear from Merges’ articles whether the costs of this
loss were incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis of the
invisible hand licensing model. Also, it could well be the case
that, from an economic perspective, offering an accessible
licensing choice would not maximize efficiency in all instances,
and leaving some creation fields without a licensing solution
would actually be more effective in promoting overall economic
efficiency. Dismissing such cases would mean promoting the
progress of science and useful arts only when such promotion is
consistent with economic efficiency standards. The fundamental
purpose of copyright, however, is to reward and advance
creativity, as opposed to economic efficiency.
As an example of a successful licensing model, Merges
points to ASCAP,189 demonstrating how ASCAP designed a
workable licensing solution for public performance rights of
musical compositions; he submits that the same model can be
imported to other copyright markets to facilitate licensing.190 The
use of ASCAP as a leading example of a prevailing model was
criticized for not adequately considering the special framework
within which ASCAP functions. To provide an effective licensing
solution, a clearance system operated via CROs would have to
cover a significant repertoire of copyrighted works and enjoy
cooperation with a substantial portion of rightholders, who
approve a pricing schedule and assign their power to allow
use.191 On top of the time required for the clearance system to
develop, a long interim period is also expected, within which the
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Merges, Contracting into
Liability Rules, supra note 29.
189 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1378 (“ASCAP’s
experience shows that it is possible to apply existing institutional know-how to a new
set of transactional problems.”).
190 Id. at 1328-40.
191 Id.
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clearance system would have to obtain comprehensiveness and
acceptance to become a true solution for the licensing failure.
The use of CROs was also criticized for creating its own market
distortion, since these organizations gain considerable market
power over time and trigger antitrust concerns.192
Another point to consider when thinking about free
market solutions is that corporate rightholders in the music
industry have been generally reluctant to provide licensing
solutions to individuals.193 Legal commentary attempted to
provide an explanation for the persistent rejection of new
licensing models that could potentially increase the industry’s
revenue. Neil Netanel points to the costs and difficulties of price
discrimination as possible grounds for the rejection.194 And while
Netanel concedes that “digital technology might lower the costs
and institutional barriers to price discrimination,” where the
user wishes to employ copyrighted content in her own expressive
work, rightholders will generally prefer “to engage in a costly,
individualized, non-automated assessment of what price to
charge.”195 Lital Helman echoes this view by arguing that music
industry executives choose control over profit-maximization.196
According to Helman, in what she describes as a classic agent-
principle problem, creators are interested in maximizing revenues
from their works, but their record companies are interested in
maximizing their control over the exploitation of works to sustain
their dominance in the market.197 Niva Elkin-Koren agrees that
rightholders may avoid licensing their content in order to
maintain their monopoly power.198 It could also be a case of non-
192 Helfer, supra note 102, at 108. (“[T]hese organizations also enjoy
substantial market power to extract monopoly rents from licensees.”).
193 Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy, supra note 65, at 79.
194 Id. (“Determining user valuations, setting differential pricing, designing
product and distribution systems to enable differential pricing, and creating and enforcing
prohibitions against consumer arbitrage require considerable information, labor, and
financial and organizational resources.”).
195 Id. Netanel also notes that copyright holders would rarely authorize
controversial and critical expression even if the offered licensing fee were reasonable. Id.
196 Lital Helman, When Your Recording Agency Turns into an Agency Problem:
The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA 49 (2009).
197 Id. at 51. (“[A]lthough on the surface the focus of the resistance to file-
sharing is on the compensation of artists. . . resistance is really driven by the fight for
control over the market of copyrighted works by the big record companies.”).
198 Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 295 (1996) (“This
concern links considerations of property and democracy, allocation of resources and
free speech . . . . The centralized structure of the information flow which draws a clear
line between producers and paying consumers is beneficial for copyright owners, and
they are most likely to maintain it. What incentive would a copyright owner have to
license users to create their own customized version of a movie?”).
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rational “herd” behavior, in which radical market changes result
from small movements irrationally imitated by others.199
Corporate rightholders typically engage in herd behavior, and are
hesitant to experiment with new business models, as
demonstrated by the music industry’s reluctance to shift to
digital distribution to provide an alternative to file sharing.200
Another example can be found in the industry’s unwillingness to
collaborate with intermediaries like online licensing store
Friendly Music, who already employs a successful licensing
platform for individual and noncommercial producers.201
All the theories that analyze the absence of licensing
solutions point to either irrational behavior on the rightholders’
end that perpetuates unsatisfied licensing demand, or to
excessive control and monopoly concerns, where rightholders are
behaving rationally but their interests counter those of society as
a whole. Both causes are of the kind that can leave the market
without a licensing solution for a long time and make the hands-
off approach less appealing. Some of these theories, such as the
agent-principle problem, call attention to a market failure that, by
itself, justifies intervention. Furthermore, the costs of inaction are
dual; these costs are derived from speech that is being concealed
or obstructed, and they stem from licensing fees that could have
been otherwise channeled to rightholders.
III. LICENSING POSSIBILITIES AND THE FAIRUSEDOCTRINE
This article contributes to the ongoing licensing discourse
by introducing a third, middle-ground approach aimed at
incentivizing rightholders to offer an efficient licensing choice
without depriving them of their property right in their creation
or otherwise forcefully intervening in market dynamics. Under
the subtle incentive theory, the existence of an efficient licensing
scheme and a user’s genuine attempt to obtain a license would
be considered whenever a fair use defense is invoked. The fourth
factor would tilt in favor of an infringer in the absence of an
199 Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and
Herd Behavior in Financial Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 724, 724 (1998).
200 Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance
and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 490-91 (2002)
(“The ‘big five’ have been reluctant to shift toward channels of digital distribution until
they have ‘secured’ their work.”).
201 In an interview with Friendly Music’s founder and CEO, Paul Anthony,
Mr. Anthony noted that the big record labels have been curious about the platform but
have not been interested in offering their content for licensing through the store yet.
Interview with Paul Anthony, supra note 83.
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accessible and reasonable licensing solution in the fair use
analysis, when a sincere attempt to obtain a license failed
because transaction costs associated with licensing were too
high. The subtle incentive theory perfectly exemplifies how, in
light of the slim chances of legislative reform in the foreseeable
future, a slight doctrinal change, for which the ground is already
set and which entails zero cost, can make a difference in
copyright reality.
In the following pages I provide a brief overview of the
fair use defense to allow better understanding of the subtle
incentive theory and its place within the doctrine.
A. The Fair Use Defense
The Fair Use defense acts as a limitation to the protection
granted to a copyright holder in section 106 of the Copyright
Act.202 Under this defense, infringing uses are excused when a
finding of infringement would unfairly frustrate copyright’s
commitment to maximizing the production and dissemination of
useful works to the public.203 Prior to its enactment as an exception
in the Copyright Act of 1976,204 the fair use doctrine existed only
as a common law, judge-made rule of reason.205 The statutory
language, however, does not formulate a bright line rule for
deciding whether a particular use is a fair use; instead, the statute
allows the uses of a protected work reflecting purposes including
“criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or
research . . . .”206 To aid courts in determining whether a use is fair,
Section 107 singles out four factors that a court should consider
when the fair use defense is invoked by an alleged infringer: (1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.207 When weighing
202 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2013) (subjecting owner’s exclusive rights to
the exceptions set forth in sections 107 through 118).
203 Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60
(2d Cir. 1980).
204 17 U.S.C. § 107.
205 Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that “[u]ntil the 1976 Copyright Act, the doctrine of fair use grew
exclusively out of the common law.”).
206 17 U.S.C. § 107.
207 Id.
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these factors, courts review each of them in consideration of the
other factors and the objectives of copyright law.208
Under the first element of the fair use test, the purpose
and character of the use, courts often consider two aspects: (1) to
what extent the work in question is transformative, and (2)
whether the infringing use is of a commercial nature or is a
nonprofit educational application.209 A creative contribution to a
copyrighted work that adds new expression, meaning, or message
to the original work,210 or changes its character or purpose, is
considered a transformative use.211 The more transformative a
work is, the greater the prospect that the use is fair, reducing the
weight of a finding of commercial nature in the analysis.212 Courts
must determine whether the work is employed commercially, for
profit-making purposes while avoiding paying acceptable license
fees to the rightholder, or for a nonprofit educational purpose.213
While predominantly commercial purpose has traditionally cut
against a finding of fair use,214 in some cases commercial uses may
still enjoy fair use privileges.215
The second fair use factor evaluates the nature of the
protected work. Fair use is harder to establish when the work at
use is “closer to the core of intended copyright protection.”216
When analyzing the second factor, courts make two distinctions:
(1) whether the work is of creative, fictional and expressive
nature or rather is purely factual, and (2) whether the work is
published or unpublished.217 Copyright law generally acknowledges
the importance of disseminating factual works, thus a finding that
the underlying work is factual weighs in favor of fair use.218
Similarly, as the law honors the rightholder’s right of first
publication, a fair use argument is weakened when the original
work is unpublished.219
208 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994); Castle Rock, 150
F.3d at 141; MELVILLE B. NIMMER&DAVIDNIMMER, 4 NIMMERONCOPYRIGHT § 13.05.
209 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1).
210 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(CCD Mass. 1841) (Story, J.)).
211 Id. at 579.
212 Id.
213 SeeHarper &Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 5661-2 (1985).
214 Id. at 562; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
215 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
216 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
217 Id.
218 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
219 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006).
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To analyze the third factor, courts consider whether “the
amount and substantiality” of the alleged infringing use was
reasonable and in relation to the purpose of the copying.220 The
courts consider both the quality and the quantity of the portion
used.221 While, as a general rule, copying entire works or
substantial portions would not qualify as fair use,222 courts have
deviated from this rule when justified by other considerations.223
The fourth factor requires a court to look at the effect of
the infringing use on the rightholder’s market for her work. As
the proposal advanced in this article involves considering
existing licensing options under the fourth factor of a fair use
analysis, the next subsection elaborates on this factor and the
way it has been applied by the Courts.
B. Licensing and Transaction Costs under the Fourth Factor
Of the fair use factors, the fourth factor has traditionally
been considered the climax of the fair use analysis.224 Since
copyright is granted to economically incentivize authors to
produce useful works for the public good,225 and since a secondary
use that impairs the market value of the original work generally
decreases incentives to create further works,226 courts infrequently
find such secondary use to be fair. In accordance with this logic, fair
use should shield acts that do not cause market harm—uses that
are either sufficiently transformative so they are unlikely to
substitute for the original work, or uses that otherwise avoid
interfering with the original work’s market.227 In addition to the
possible harm to the market for the original work, the fourth
factor also considers potential harm to the logical markets for
220 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013).
221 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565-66.
222 WILLIAMF. PATRY, THEFAIRUSEPRIVILEGE INCOPYRIGHTLAW 449 (1985).
223 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984)
(finding fair use in time shifting notwithstanding the fact that the copyrighted works
were reproduced in their entirety, is an important example for such exception.).
224 The superior importance of this factor was stated in a great number of cases.
See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods.,
Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,
796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers,
Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980). However, the Supreme Court in Campbell held
that all of the factors are given equal consideration, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
225 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558-59.
226 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
227 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992).
Copyright law, however, does not secure against uses that only reduce demand for the
rightholder’s work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
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derivative works, even if such markets have not yet materialized.228
Only markets that rightholders would develop or license others to
develop are included in the relevant derivative markets.229
Furthermore, courts must consider whether widespread conduct
similar to the alleged infringer’s use would have an adverse
effect on the copyright owner’s ability to market the work.230 If
the secondary use is noncommercial, the burden to prove such
harm might be placed on the copyright owner.231
While the subject of the market harm analysis under the
fourth factor is only a market that is traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed, this definition has proved to be fairly
expansive. The underlying confusion stems from the fact that
“market harm” is an abstract legal concept, which entails
reference to an established entitlement.232 Copyright entitlement
encompasses the owner’s right to profit from the sales of her
work. However, the aggregation of all conceivable harm from a
widespread use in, inter alia, markets for derivative works, was
criticized for deeming any fair use claim unsuccessful.233 A
defendant would never be able to prove that her use, if widely
imitated, would not substitute any potential future market in
some derivative of the original work.234 Similarly, the inclusion of
lost licensing fees under the definition of market harm was
criticized for collapsing the fourth factor into circularity:235 there
can always be a claim for market harm because the rightholder
could have received a license fee for the very use that is at issue.
But if the use is fair, the market for that use was not granted to
the rightholder, and there was no obligation on the alleged
infringer’s end to obtain a license for the use.236
228 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568; See also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592-93.
229 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. For example, criticism is not recognized as a
protectable derivative market since rightholders generally do not license critical
assessments. Id.
230 Id. at 591.
231 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
232 Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85
Wash. U.L. Rev. 969, 977 (2007) [hereinafter Bohannan, Copyright Harm].
233 Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1607, 1653 (2009).
234 Id. at 1653-54. Indeed, the Second Circuit acknowledged that “were a court
automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were
impermissibly impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to
engage in the use, the fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.” Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994).
235 Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 189-90 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Licensing Market].
236 Bohannan, Copyright Harm, supra note 232, at 978; see also Lemley,
Licensing Market, supra note 235, at 190-91.
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Courts started to make allowance for lost licensing
revenue under a fair use analysis in the 1990s,237 and most
significantly in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco.238 Texaco’s
scientists regularly photocopied journal articles in the company
library for personal archival purposes. Although Texaco purchased
subscriptions to the journals for an institutional fee that was
substantially more expensive than the individual licensing fee, it
was sued for copyright infringement.239 Against Texaco’s fair use
argument, the plaintiffs claimed that the use was unfair as it
interfered with the market for the copyrighted articles; if Texaco’s
scientists were not allowed to make copies of the articles, Texaco
would have acquired additional paid copies for its scientists to
use.240 While the publishers failed to show actual lost sales, they
succeeded in asserting that they suffered the loss of potential
licensing revenue, since Texaco might have been inclined to pay
for either additional subscriptions or a photocopying license for its
existing journals.241 The Texaco court attempted to address the
circularity issue by holding that while the effect on potential
licensing revenues should be appraised in reviewing the fourth
fair use factor, only licensing of “traditional, reasonable, or likely
to be developed markets” is appropriate for consideration.242
The Texaco decision was nonetheless widely criticized; its
reasoning failed to appease most critics.243 Furthermore, many
commentators raised concerns about the interests of secondary
users alleging fair use, and did not share the court’s view that
the reference to a defined “normal” market could effectually
237 Lemley, Licensing Market, supra note 235, at 189 (citing Frank
Pasquale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55
CASEW.RES. L. REV. 777, 778 (2005)).
238 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930-31. Other cases have also used the theory of lost
licensing revenue in their fourth factor analysis. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Basic Books Inc. v.
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
239 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
240 Lemley, Licensing Market, supra note 235, at 189-90.
241 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931.
242 Id. at 929-30.
243 See Bohannan, Copyright Harm, supra note 232, at 971; Christina
Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 905, 973-74 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1277 n.98 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and
Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 1030 (2002) [hereinafter Lunney,
Fair Use]; Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2620
(2009); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433,
457-59 (2007). But see Gordon, Fair Use Markets, supra note 45, at 1834 (arguing that
the circularity criticism is overstated: “a bad circular argument is commonly defined as
one that ‘commits the logical fallacy of assuming what it is attempting to prove.’ This
the Texaco court does not do, for it is possible to take the incentive effects of physically
foregone license fees into account and yet find fair use for the defendant”).
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prevent strategic manipulations by rightholders to make any use
appear as if a reasonable market for it existed.244 Licensing can
become customary when repeat players or users with deep
pockets, who are often copyright owners themselves, are willing
to pay for the use because they know that such payment secures
their ability to license their copyright to non-repeat players in
the newly created market.245 A rule that eliminates unpaid uses
of copyrighted works merely because a paid license was offered
for the use incentivizes rightholders to develop such a licensing
market for all possible uses.246 Rightholders can require
licensing even for uses that seem clearly fair, simply by threat of
litigation.247 Consequently, a licensing market can be established
when users choose to obtain licenses for borderline-acceptable
uses rather than risk the cost of litigation.248 Users would prefer
to pay for three reasons: first, licensing fees are often lower than
litigation costs; second, some users (especially in the
entertainment industry) would settle for paying for the use to
avoid the risk of injunctive relief; and third, a user may fear the
reputational harm associated with being identified as a
copyright infringer.249 When a licensing fee is paid for non-
infringing uses, a new licensing market is established which
244 Gordon, Fair Use Markets, supra note 45, at 1827-28; Loren, Market
Failure, supra note 10, at 41-44.
245 Loren, Market Failure, supra note 10, at 41 (“If a copyright owner, or an
industry of copyright owners, convince[s] enough users to pay for a certain type of use,
then the ‘price’ becomes customary. Often the first users to pay the requested fees are
those copyright owners in the industry who, through a gentlemen’s agreement, have
undertaken to pay fees.”); see also Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in
Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1145, 1172 (2000) (noting that “[f]or the consumer or the creator without an inventory
of valuable works, this result is more troubling. Not only may she be held accountable
for another user’s caution, but there is also no corresponding benefit to her from a
custom of payment”).
246 Lemley, Licensing Market, supra note 235, at 190-91 (“And indeed they
have done so. Not only has the market for photocopy permissions skyrocketed, but
copyright owners are charging for rights to home viewing of television programs, rap-
music samples, and even the right to parody their works. One can similarly imagine a
copyright owner making claims of lost revenue from being unable to license fan fiction,
satire, and even criticism.”).
247 Africa, supra note 245, at 1172; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:
HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004); Lemley, Licensing Market, supra note 235 at 190-91.
The licensing practice of the CCC has been criticized for not considering limitations
such as fair use, and because they seek to license every use of a published work. L. RAY
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, A LAW OF USERS’
RIGHTS 181-86 (1991).
248 Africa, supra note 245, at 1172.
249 Id. at 1172-73.
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may weigh heavily against the fairness of a use in subsequent
cases where the fee is not paid.250
The Texaco decision and its successors have been
accused of wrongfully applying the market failure approach to
fair use251 by addressing only one kind of market failure while
neglecting to acknowledge other classes of failures.252 The view
that the transaction costs failure caused by the licensing process
can be alleviated through a permission system is indeed correct.
But the availability of such a system cannot eliminate other
market failures such as “diffuse external benefits that cannot be
efficiently internalized in any bargained-for exchange.”253
Professor Lydia Pallas Loren identifies non-transformative uses
in the context of research, scholarship, and education, and
demonstrates that the threat of a market failure is not removed
by reducing the transaction costs.254 Such analysis does not
count the significant external benefits that those uses may
have, and can wrongfully deem them unfair.255
The consideration of lost potential licensing revenue
was also attacked for not distinguishing between the ability to
charge for a use and the legal requirement to do so. As
articulated by Professor Gideon Parchomovsky:
[T]he ability to charge by itself cannot possibly determine legal
rights. A hoodlum might have the ability to charge protection
fees . . . and yet no one would argue that this in itself gives him a
right to do that . . . . Absent an underlying theory of rights, the
ability to charge is normatively meaningless.256
Indeed, while copyright law grants rightholders control over
uses within the scope of their exclusive rights, it does not
bestow upon them the power to control every possible use of
their works.257 The fair use defense serves copyright’s ultimate
goal of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts”258 by
limiting authors’ monopoly rights.259 Thus, when defining the
250 Id.; see also James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007).
251 The market failure approach of fair use was introduced in 1982. See
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 6, at 1600; see also infra notes 311-25
and accompanying text, which elaborate on the market failure approach.




256 Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3
LEGAL THEORY 347, 360 (1997).
257 Elkin-Koren, supra note 198, at 292.
258 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
259 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
2015] THE SUBTLE INCENTIVE THEORY 1397
spectrum of uses that the rightholder may license, courts
should not look at what uses the rightholder can or is willing to
license, but rather at the character of the use at issue and its
desirability from a public policy perspective.260
After Texaco, courts have been trying to answer the
critics by announcing that the mere offering of a license would
not deem a use unfair. In Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v.
Carol Publishing Group, Inc. the court gave the examples of
“parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative
uses,” as uses that are within “fair use markets”; thus,
exploitation of the market by fair uses cannot be preempted by
offering to license the uses.261 The same rationale—defining the
fair use market based on a normatively substantial character of
the use—was restated in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd.262 In Dorling Kindersley, the Second Circuit
held that in a market for “transformative” uses (a fair use
market), the loss of license fees would not be weighed against
the defendant when analyzing the fourth factor.263 In a
different case, the Ninth Circuit held that the use of thumbnail
images in Google’s image search engine was transformative
and fair, even though a market for downloading thumbnail
images to mobile phones existed.264 Additional courts have
followed suit,265 while others have insisted on broadly defining
the relevant markets.266
260 Elkin-Koren, supra note 198, at 292-93.
261 Castle Rock Entm’t. v. Carol Publ’g. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d
Cir. 1998).
262 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d
Cir. 2006). Gordon, Fair Use Markets, supra note 6, at 1830-32, points out that even
the clear language of Dorling Kindersley is not without problems.
263 Dorling Kindersley, 448 F.3d at 615.
264 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2007).
This decision overruled the district court’s finding that the use was unfair because a
market for thumbnail images existed. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828,
848-49 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
265 See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d
537, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (announcing that “while a copyright holder’s current participation
in a given market is relevant to the determination of whether the market is ‘traditional,
reasonable, or likely to be developed,’ it is not determinative”); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd.
v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that free use of the images
was allowed regardless of the growing practice of licensing photos of public domain images).
266 See, for example the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Bridgeport Music v.
Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). Although the court did not conduct a
fair use analysis, its decision highlighted the rightholder’s economic right to his work
notwithstanding the transformative character of the secondary use. See also Fox
Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1104-05 (C.D. Cal. 2012),
where the court held that the fourth factor weighed against the use, even though there
was no evidence of existence of a market for quality assurance copies.
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Recently, two cases involving uses by non-profit
educational institutions linked the fourth fair use factor to actual
licensing practices. In Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker,267 the
district court found that the copying of small excerpts from books
for teaching purposes by the defendant, Georgia State University,
was a fair use.268 When discussing the effect of the defendant’s use
on the plaintiffs’ market, the court estimated whether a
practicable licensing option was obtainable for the institution.269
The court echoed the Texaco decision and held that the
availability of licensing has an effect on the value of the
copyrighted work: “[i]f available permissions are not paid, the
value of the copyright is less than it otherwise would be.”270
According to the court, an appropriate licensing solution only
exists when licenses are “easily accessible, reasonably priced,
and . . . in a format which is reasonably convenient for users.”271
Where such licenses are readily available, and the fees are not
paid, there is a powerful argument against finding fair use. The
court also noted that while actual licensing practice could be
regarded as a separate fair use test, the court treats it within
the fourth factor evaluation because it involves nonpayment of
permissions fees, thus pertinent to the analysis.272
The Cambridge case was recently reversed in appeal.273
The Eleventh Circuit found in favor of Oxford University Press,
but agreed with most of the District Court’s analysis of the
fourth fair use factor.274 The court held that
absent evidence to the contrary, if a copyright holder has not made a
license available to use a particular work in a particular manner, the
inference is that the author or publisher did not think that there
would be enough such use to bother making a license available. In
such a case, there is little damage to the publisher’s market when
someone makes use of the work in that way without obtaining a
license, and hence the fourth factor should generally weigh in favor
of fair use.275
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that if licensing isn’t
offered for a legitimate reason the use should not be considered
267 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1243 (N.D. Ga.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 2014).
268 Id. at 1223-40.
269 Id. at 1235-40.
270 Id. at 1237.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1239.
273 See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F. 3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).
274 Id. at 1275-83.
275 Id. at 1277.
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fair, and emphasized that cases of this sort concern “a market for
licenses to use Plaintiffs’ works in a particular way.”276 Explaining
the rationale behind its reasoning, the court also pointed out that
plaintiffs can rebut the presumption of no market by presenting
evidence of existing or potential license availability.277
In Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,278 the court did not
find potential market harm in the making of digital copies, for
search and print-disabled access purposes, by groups of libraries
in cooperation with Google. The crux of the fair use analysis was
the transformative nature of the use, despite the fact that the
searching, text mining, and print-disabled access opportunities
provided by the defendants’ use created a distinct market for the
plaintiffs’ works.279 Nevertheless, the court also considered the
effect of the challenged use upon the market of the work. First,
the court rejected the argument that the production of digital
copies by the defendants represented lost sales because the
copies offered for purchase by plaintiffs would not have allowed
the transformative uses advanced by the defendants’ copying.280
The court also found plaintiffs’ argument of potential market
harm speculative, holding that since the uses at issue are
transformative, the harm arises, if at all, to a transformative
market, which is not a part of “traditional, reasonable or likely
to be developed markets.”281 Interestingly, the court also looked
at evidence offered by the defendants to show that it would be
prohibitively expensive to develop a market to license the use of
works for the purposes at issue and that the potential revenue
generated from such uses would not cover the licensing costs.282
Consequently, the court found that the high costs associated with
developing such a market would prohibit its very formation, and
thus “there will be no one to buy the goods from.”283
276 Id. at 1277-78.
277 Id. at 1279-80.
278 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
279 Id. at 457-62.
280 Meaning either full-text searches or access for the print-disabled
individuals. Id. at 462.
281 Id. at 463 (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931
(2d Cir. 1994).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 464. The court also notes that “[a]lthough Plaintiffs assert that the
CCC could eventually develop a license for the uses to which Defendants put the
works . . . , the CCC has no plans to provide for or develop such a license.” Id.
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C. The Nonexistence of a Licensing Choice under the Fourth
Factor Analysis
The previous discussion detailed the considerations that
courts have weighed under the fourth fair use factor, as well as
the relevance of existing and potential licensing markets within
that analysis. As explained above, courts have been criticized for
shrinking the scope of fair use by setting the limits of possible
licensing markets for a copyrighted work too broadly and using
circular analysis. This article seeks to introduce an additional
observation. Courts have frequently considered the presence of
licensing in existing and potential markets for copyrighted
works to deny fair use claims. But until recently, the argument
has not fully extended to the reverse cases. While evidence of a
functioning licensing market has traditionally favored the
rightholder, the absence of such a market has neither been given
similar weight in favor of the secondary user, nor been considered
an integral part of the inquiry.284 Indeed, the Texaco court
indicated that “it is not unsound to conclude that the right to
seek payment for a particular use tends to become legally
cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for
paying for such use is made easier.”285 Nearly 18 years later, and
more unequivocally, the Cambridge and HathiTrust decisions
incorporated the lack of actual and potential licensing practices
under the fourth factor to favor the defendant arguing fair use.
These decisions do not signify a shift into full consideration
of missing licensing possibilities under the fourth factor; such
consideration has not yet occurred for three reasons: (1) since
the incorporation of efficient licensing choices into the fair use
analysis was introduced in the Texaco decision in 1994,
hundreds of decisions engaged in a fair use discussion, but the
Cambridge and HathiTrust cases are the only two decisions that
considered the nonexistence of a licensing choice in favor of
finding fair use;286 (2) the HathiTrust appellate court did not
point to the licensing failure as a mitigating factor in its fair use
analysis, and Cambridge may yet be overruled by the Supreme
Court;287 and (3) the cases share similar factual characteristics
284 That is, until the recent decision in Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863
F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1237, rev’d sub nom. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232
(7th Cir. 2014), which is discussed at length above.
285 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930-31.
286 A list of all fair use cases since the Texaco decision that looked at licensing
under the fourth factor to negate fair use is on file with the author.
287 See Keith Button, Georgia State Digital Copyright Suit Could Go to Supreme
Court, EDUCATION DIVE (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.educationdive.com/news/georgia-
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which strongly favor a finding of fair use—the defendants in
both cases are nonprofit institutions, the use was done for
educational purposes, and the works at issue pertain to the
market for texts and books. Thus, even if upheld on appeal,
those rulings could be rightfully interpreted as applicable only
for uses of copyrighted texts within noncommercial settings that
are done for educational purposes.
Furthermore, and most importantly, the cases do not
provide a complete and accurate statement of how to include the
appropriate licensing choices within the four factor analysis. The
statement is incomplete because it does not present the lack of such
choices as a factor favoring the defendant in a fair use inquiry. To
the extent one accepts the Texaco reasoning that the existence of
an appropriate licensing mechanism is a consideration against fair
use, one should acknowledge the absence of such a mechanism as a
consideration for finding a use fair.
The statements provided by the Texaco and Cambridge
courts (and to some extent also by the HathiTrust court) also err
because they consider the reasonableness of the licensing price as
a new element under the fourth factor without explaining the
justification for either its presence or its application.288 As a
property right, copyright endows the owner of the work with the
power to charge any amount for the use of her work; hence,
considering the reasonableness of the licensing fee in a fair use
analysis conflicts greatly with the proprietary grant of copyright.
The assumption is that in a functioning market, rational players
would produce the most efficient transaction. Rightholders are in
state-digital-copyright-suit-could-go-to-supreme-court/351254/; Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2014).
288 See Texaco, 60 F.3d 930-31 (“Despite Texaco’s claims to the contrary, it is not
unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become
legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a
use is made easier. This notion is not inherently troubling: it is sensible that a particular
unauthorized use should be considered ‘more fair’ when there is no ready market or
means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered ‘less fair’
when there is a ready market or means to pay for the use.”); Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d at
1237 (“This Court agrees with Texaco that where excerpts are reasonably available, at a
reasonable price, it is only fair for this fact to be considered in determining whether
Defendants’ unpaid uses of excerpts constitutes a fair use . . . . For loss of potential license
revenue to cut against fair use, the evidence must show that licenses for excerpts of the
works at issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced, and that they offer excerpts in a
format which is reasonably convenient for users.”); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902
F. Supp. 2d 445, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Defendants offer substantial evidence that it
would be prohibitively expensive to develop a market to license the use of works for
search purposes, access for print-disabled individuals, or preservation purposes.”) (citing
a declaration which “estimate[ed] that the costs of such a license as to the works in the
HDL would be in the neighborhood of $569 million and that the potential revenue
generated would not cover these costs so it was not a ‘commercially viable endeavor.’”).
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the best position to determine the right price to trigger such a
transaction because, when setting the price of the entitlement,
they will “transfer it only when infringers value it more highly
and are willing to prove it by paying in advance.”289 Furthermore,
even if the license price is set too high at the outset, the effects of
market competition are expected to drive down prices to a
competitive rate over time.
The Texaco, Cambridge, and HathiTrust courts also
neglected to explain to what extent the licensing price should
impact the fair use inquiry. Treating the reasonableness of the
price within the fourth factor can help courts recognize strategic
behavior by rightholders who license certain uses of their work
in order to create the sham of available licensing regimes for
litigation purposes,290 or who refuse to license certain uses in
order to uphold their economic and political strength, or to avoid
undermining the value of their work through secondary uses.291
For this reason, reference to the price should be made only to
frustrate preclusion strategies that use price as a means to
prevent licensing in certain markets. In all other cases, however,
the power to determine the price should remain in the
rightholder’s hands.
The decisions also failed to address the question of how
a “reasonable” price should be defined and calculated. The
appropriate price could be based upon various factors that are
not only hard to determine in the first place, but also depend
on the context of the use and the nature of the market. Aside
from the differentiation issue, even once established, the
reasonableness factors are highly susceptible to market changes.
Consequently, absent an obligatory statutory or administrative
guideline, there is no way to predict ex ante what price would
be acceptable as “reasonable.” Even if such a set of formal rules
to inform rightholders could be devised, it is appropriately left
to the legislature.292
289 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 29, at 1306.
290 See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
291 Rightholders can use the price as a means to exclude a certain market. For
example, they can offer a license to non-commercial users at a price which is prohibitively
expensive so those users would not be able to afford it, and so the rightholder would not
have to manage licensing in the non-commercial market. Such strategic behavior is
considered under the subtle incentive theory. See infra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
292 “[I]t is not the [Court’s] job to apply laws that have not yet been written.”
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
2015] THE SUBTLE INCENTIVE THEORY 1403
IV. THE SUBTLE INCENTIVETHEORY OFCOPYRIGHTLICENSING
As the previous discussion highlights, the availability of
licensing choices has already been imported into the fair use
doctrine. However, while the existence of a workable licensing
alternative has been accounted to deny fair use by the Texaco
court, courts have failed to contemplate the reverse side of the
inquiry. Aside from two recent cases involving relatively
comparable factual settings, the absence of a licensing choice has
not been appropriately evaluated to support a finding of fair use
under the fourth factor. Mending this logical error would not only
produce better-balanced fair use reasoning, but also would
advance a subtle incentive to develop accessible licensing
systems—the ultimate goal advocated for by this article.
Substantively, the subtle incentive theory rewards
rightholders who employ licensing markets by weighing the
licensing subtest against fair use while motivating rightholders
who refrain from licensing in certain markets (or sweepingly) by
favoring fair use under the same subtest. The licensing choice
that the subtle incentive theory ideally seeks to inspire is one
where prospective users are able, after identifying and locating a
rightholder, to get a quote for the desired use or reasonably
negotiate towards a license. For this purpose, when determining
whether an efficient and accessible licensing alternative exists,
courts should look at the journey of a prospective user in the
relevant market at the time preceding the use. The review
should remain objective at all times; for example, the court
should look at a prospective reasonable user, as opposed to the
defendant in the case, and any manifestation of intent should
not be relevant to the inquiry unless that intent was factually
proven to promote or hinder the licensing process.
For the licensing subtest to be applied in the fair use
analysis, the defendant has to demonstrate an attempt to acquire
a license. In other words, only users who made a reasonable effort
to obtain a license would benefit from the licensing subtest of fair
use under the subtle incentive theory. It is fairer for a defendant
who unsuccessfully endeavored to obtain a license to receive the
shield of fair use, than it is to give a defendant who never
intended to pay for her use the windfall of the licensing failure.
Furthermore, rewarding a defendant’s licensing pursuit is
supported by the market failure theory of fair use—fair use
would apply only when the market failure actually impedes
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licensing.293 It is important to note that some courts have treated
licensing attempts as prejudicial to a defendant’s fair use
claim.294 Such an approach is clearly not consistent with the
subtle incentive theory, or even copyright’s intended goals,
because weighing attempts to license against a defendant
arguing fair use discourages licensing. While the motivation
behind this view is socially desirable—combating the “clearance
culture” that dominates copyright markets these days295—it
cannot be justified as a general matter in light of fair use’s
ambiguous standards. Due to the doctrine’s equitable, fact-
specific, and indeterminate nature, there is no affirmative way
for those who want to use a copyrighted work to make an
accurate, ex ante determination of the fairness of their use.296
Thus, in many cases, it makes better sense to secure a license to
shelter one’s use from immensely costly legal actions.297 While
the arguments against the clearance culture surely have
weight,298 it is unwise to fight the clearance culture by treating a
licensing attempt as prejudicial to fair use because when users
face the choice of either making an uncertain fair use or avoiding
the use, risk-averse users and even risk-neutral users would opt
for the latter, thus lessening beneficial secondary creation.299
When a user has to choose between making a use that may be
classified as an infringement, avoiding the use, or paying for a
license even if the use may be fair, the last option is the least
bad choice and bears the least social loss out of the three.
The strategy proposed by the subtle incentive theory is both
logical and practical. The subtle incentive theory is sufficiently
bounded to avoid substantial harm to rightholders’ creation
incentives. Encouraging rightholders to license by modifying the
fair use calculus means that the licensing inquiry does not
condemn a given case to a particular result; it is only one among
293 See infra notes 326-45 and accompanying text.
294 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1121 (2007).
Nevertheless, if the rightholder would in no case agree to negotiate a license, the case
for fair use may be strengthened. Id.
295 The Clearance Culture is “the shared set of expectations that all rights
must always be cleared.” PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC.
MEDIA, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE
CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2004), http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/
default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf.
296 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 889 (2007).
297 Not to mention the fact that “the simple reality is that finding out whether
permission is required usually costs more than getting permission.” Id. at 885.
298 AUFDERHEIDE& JASZI, supra note 295, at 22.
299 Gibson, supra note 250, at 890. Also, “the decision-makers in the real world
of copyright practice are typically risk-averse.” Id. at 891.
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a number of criteria considered by the courts.300 The subtle
incentive theory adds another balancing variable to be
considered that can affect, but not determine, the award of a fair
use treatment. In other words, the mere lack of licensing choice
would not be sufficient to tip the scale in favor of the defendant
when a secondary use fails all or part of the other fair use tests
and does not accord well with the essence of fair use.
By incorporating the subtle incentive theory into the
fair use calculus, the theory achieves three important policy
goals. First, it is expected to stimulate the development of
licensing mechanisms in the market, especially by corporate
rightholders and repeat players who would be most affected by
the inclusion of the licensing inquiry in the fair use doctrine.
Second, the subtle incentive theory respects two kinds of
creation: early creation and secondary creation that builds on
protected elements of early creation. Copyright is intended to
incentivize both creations, but frequently favors the former at
the expense of the latter. By spurring the development of
licensing alternatives, the subtle incentive theory better
balances the rights and incentives of early creators with those
of their secondary successors. Third, the subtle incentive theory
sends an important message about the desired policy that
copyright seeks to enforce; it is a policy where rightholders are
appropriately compensated for the use of their work, while
secondary users enjoy a hassle-free or relatively simple way to
lawfully use a copyrighted work.
The subtle incentive theory is proposed as a middle-
ground solution to encourage rightholders to engage in licensing
their works. As such, it shares some of the aspects of each of the
existing proposals. As opposed to statutory strategies, the subtle
incentive theory does not involve aggressive intervention via
legislation, a step that has been criticized for its destructive
effects on copyright markets, and is very unlikely to occur in the
near future. The subtle incentive theory also does not require the
repudiation of prior judicial precedents. Instead, it offers a
doctrinal modification, which in light of existing case law is better
defined as a doctrinal adjustment that can be implemented easily
and at zero cost.
300 Gordon notes that the Texaco court used a similar argument to explain
how physically foregone license fees can be considered without falling into circular
reasoning: “fatal circularity can be avoided by treating physically foregone license fees
as a part of the analysis rather than conclusive on fair use.” Gordon, Fair Use Markets,
supra note 45, at 1838.
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Like compulsory licensing proposals, but to a lesser
extent, the subtle incentive theory involves intervention in
transactions that may have taken place voluntarily in the
market. It does not, however, interfere with the proprietary
rights of copyright owners; it leaves the choice to license and the
setting of the price in the hands of rightholders. Contrary to the
invisible hand perspective, the subtle incentive theory does not
leave the market untouched, and indirectly interferes with
players’ choices. Nevertheless, market solutions may still be
developed by rightholders in accordance with the invisible hand
vision because in the interim period, until those solutions are
implemented, rightholders are motivated to engage in licensing.
Most importantly, the subtle incentive theory enjoys great
flexibility—even a rightholder who lost a fair use case because,
inter alia, she did not offer an accessible and efficient licensing
system can change that fate for all future uses by being
reasonably responsive to subsequent licensing inquiries in the
relevant market.
The consequences produced by the subtle incentive theory
may seem conflicting at first. The subtle incentive theory is
intended to incentivize licensing, thus increasing the number of
licensing transactions in the copyright market. Also as a practical
matter, the subtle incentive theory would broaden fair use by
considering in the analysis the lack of licensing alternatives
coupled with the existence of licensing choices as already
introduced into the calculus by the Texaco court. As licensing and
fair use are traditionally considered incompatible, the dual
motivation seems counter-intuitive: if under the subtle incentive
theory more uses would be licensed, then logically the number of
fair uses should drop, because fair uses do not require a license.
This intuition, however, is predicated on a mistaken premise that
there are only two categories of use between early and secondary
creators—fair uses and licensed uses—thus a drop in one must be
reflected by an increase in the other. There are, however, four
categories of use between early and secondary creators: licensed
uses, fair uses, infringing uses, and non-uses.301 Indeed, fair uses
do not require a license, and most licensed uses are probably not
fair. However, secondary users have two other choices: infringe on
the rightholder’s copyright or avoid the use. The increased number
301 There are also uses that are authorized under some exemption or
limitation to the author’s exclusive rights, and uses that are available under some
informal practice. The former can be classified in the same group with fair uses, while
the latter can be classified as a licensed use, even though this license is not directly
given to the secondary user and can be revoked as the rightholder wishes.
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of licensing choices and the stretched boundaries of fair use under
the subtle incentive theory are expected to attract users who are
either engaging in piracy or avoiding the use because they could
not obtain a license and were too risk averse to rely on the fair use
doctrine. Thus, the increase in the number of licensed uses under
the subtle incentive theory is not necessarily because uses that
otherwise would have been fair are instead preceded by obtaining
licenses. It is the other two groups, non-uses and infringing uses,
that are expected to shrink when more uses are licensed or
deemed fair under the subtle incentive theory.
In the following pages, I offer a set of guidelines to be
used by courts when considering the existence of an efficient
licensing scheme within their fourth factor review. But before
that, I would like to emphasis that while this article introduces
the subtle incentive theory, it does not by any means attempt
to provide an exhaustive set of guidelines. Instead, I wish to
plant the seeds for a fruitful scholarly discussion as to the best
application of the subtle incentive theory to promote better
licensing alternatives for secondary users and, by so doing,
encourage further creation.
Burden of Proof: To invoke the non-existence of licensing
in her favor, a defendant would have to demonstrate a bona-fide
attempt to acquire a license. Once such a showing is made, the
burden of proof would shift to the plaintiff to prove that the
licenses were offered in the relevant market for the relevant use.
By allocating the burden of proof this way, each party is
responsible for validating facts that would be more efficiently
provable by themselves—the defendant is in the best position to
confirm that she attempted to obtain a license and support such
claim with relevant evidence, while the plaintiff is in the best
position to testify about her existing licensing choices, business
model, and policy.
Identifying and Locating Rightholders: More often than
not, the ability to effortlessly identify and locate a rightholder
would be directly linked to the existence of a licensing choice in
the relevant market. Yet the process of identifying and locating a
rightholder should not, as a general matter, be part of the inquiry.
Efforts to facilitate the identification and location process should
undoubtedly be made in other channels, but the subtle incentive
theory does not impose the burden of being easily identified on
rightholders, as such an obligation makes no practical or
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theoretical sense.302 The rule would not apply, however, when
evidence suggests that a rightholder was actively attempting to
be undiscoverable. Reasons for such concealing behavior can be
licensing-related (e.g., strategic behavior for the purpose of foiling
a possible fair use defense), but may also be personal or artistic
(e.g., seeking to avoid criticism or maintain artistic anonymity).
Irrespective of the motivations behind such attempts, when
looking at licensing alternatives, the court should consider
intentionally created obscuration. Rightholders should not pay
the price for objective obstacles that may hinder their
detectability, but they certainly should bear the consequences of
deliberately interfering with the first step of licensing.
Accordingly, the defendant bears the burden of proving that she
could not identify or locate the rightholder because the latter was
deliberately undiscoverable.
At this point, it is important to note that a user’s sincere
yet failed attempt to locate a rightholder would also not impact
a fair use analysis under the subtle incentive theory. A user’s
effort in this context may indicate that the user had intent to
acquire a license; nonetheless intent has nothing to do with the
actual existence of an accessible licensing alternative. As the
subtle incentive theory is designed to incentivize the offering of
licensing in the market, a user’s intent, while potentially
relevant to other considerations like good faith,303 should not be
part of the licensing review.
Contacting the Rightholder: Courts ought to look at the
defendant’s options for contacting the rightholder—how could the
rightholder be reached? The availability of a working email
account and/or telephone number may establish that the
rightholder is available for licensing inquiries. Continual attempts
to contact a rightholder that failed due to unresponsiveness of the
latter can provide a strong indication of the lack of a licensing
alternative in the market for the challenged use.
Market Differentiation: The fourth factor of fair use is
predicated on the premise that a rightholder can offer his work for
licensing in more than one market. Thus, a use that interferes
with a market that is already exploited or that is expected to be
302 This is true especially for individuals, non-commercial, semi-commercial,
and small-scale corporate rightholders.
303 Because the listing of fair use purposes and factors is “not intended to be
exhaustive,” courts are authorized to consider factors other than the four specified in the
statute. The courts have made allowances for additional factors including the defendant’s
good or bad faith. PATRY ON FAIR USE § 7:1 (2013). See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994); Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1984); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118-23 (D. Nev. 2006).
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normally developed is deemed unfair under the fourth factor.
Following the same premise, the subtle incentive theory probes
the various markets for the work, including the one in which the
challenged use takes place. Offering licensing in one market (or
more) does not benefit the rightholder in a fair use analysis unless
accessible licensing exists in the relevant market to which the
defendant’s use appertains. Examples of market differentiation
include commercial uses as opposed to non-commercial uses,
licensing the work as a whole as opposed to licensing partial uses,
medium-related licensing (i.e., licensing only for TV/Newspaper/or
specific Internet platforms), licensing the use of a hard copy as
opposed to a digital copy, and licensing a work for national use
only, as opposed to international licensing.
Rightholders may avoid licensing in a certain market for
a variety of reasons. For instance, a decision not to employ a
particular market may be grounded in a cost-benefit analysis
that concludes the costs would exceed the expected revenue. A
similar decision might be based on timing prioritization—a
rightholder may plan to eventually employ several markets, but
start by investing in developing licensing choices in only one or
two markets. Rightholders may also choose not to license for
ideological reasons, privacy concerns, a desire to avoid large
scale distribution of the work, or unfamiliarity with additional
markets that could benefit from a licensing alternative. Even
though some of those reasons are economically sound, none of
them should matter. If a market is lacking an accessible
licensing mechanism, users in that market are left with no legal
alternative other than fair use or non-use, and it is exactly this
scarcity that the subtle incentive theory wishes to curtail.
Pricing: When looking at licensing markets for the
purpose of fair use, courts should not generally reference the
license price. Copyright bestows upon a rightholder a proprietary
entitlement, the essence of which is the power to set a chosen price
and to gain as large a share of the profit as possible.304
Furthermore, many of the weaknesses of compulsory licenses
are associated with the difficulty of determining the right price
for the relevant market.305 There are countless factors that should
be looked at when contemplating a ceiling price for a license,
including many that are context-specific. It is highly speculative
and virtually impossible to formulate clear guidelines as to what
304 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1148 (1990).
305 See supra notes 127 and 130-133 and accompanying text.
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price would be considered reasonable. Moreover, even if such a
list could be devised, it would be prone to market changes, which
would make it irrelevant shortly after it was concocted. In other
words, once a rightholder offers a license, the goal of the subtle
incentive theory is reached. Where a licensing alternative exists,
but the price is set too high, users would simply opt not to
purchase a license, and the rightholder is expected to either
adjust her pricing accordingly or leave it as is, if she values the
work more.
The exception to the above rule is if the court finds that a
rightholder has been using pricing as a strategy to preclude a
certain market. In those cases, the price of the license should be
analyzed as part of the court’s review of market differentiation.
For example, when a rightholder sets the license price for
commercial uses and noncommercial uses to be the same, it
could be that the rightholder is trying to avoid licensing for
noncommercial uses. The courts, thus, would need to look into
the causes for the similarity in the pricing, and learn whether
those reasons are rooted in a desire to exclude noncommercial
uses from the possibility of licensing or if the similarity can be
justified on other grounds.
Product Differentiation: The above discussion of market
differentiation applies to product differentiation as well.
Rightholders can decide not to provide a license for a certain use
in a certain market, and likewise they can choose not to license
one or some of the informational products in their repertoire, but
if they do so choose, then fair use will likely be found. For
example, a rightholder may license the right to remix a certain
musical track, but would, under no circumstances, allow the
remix of a different work of hers. In such a case, the rightholder
would still exercise the power to refuse licensing, but the
licensing subtest would weigh for fair use because a realistic
licensing alternative was missing.
Efficient and Accessible: The called-for licensing choice
would be deemed efficient and accessible if the rightholder or
someone on her behalf is reasonably available for and responsive
to licensing inquiries. The subtle incentive theory does not
impose on a rightholder an obligation to maintain a constantly
working licensing system, and does not view rightholders as
licensing service providers. Naturally, the existence of a licensing
system that is efficiently operating to serve secondary users
would provide a strong indication against fair use. However,
rightholders who are available and responsive for licensing
inquiries, in the sense that users can communicate with them and
2015] THE SUBTLE INCENTIVE THEORY 1411
either negotiate a license or get a quote for the specific desired
use, would also be successful in showing the existence of a
licensing choice in the market. Availability and responsiveness
require rightholders to respond to users’ requests in a timely
fashion with clear answers.
Like any other legal rule, the consideration of availability
and responsiveness is also susceptible to creative manipulations
by rightholders, who may be available and responsive but
nonetheless frustrate licensing of their works. Thus, like the
consideration of pricing, the rule about availability and
responsiveness would not stand when a rightholder excludes a
specific market from her potential licensing markets either by
sweepingly rejecting all licensing requests or by offering a similar
price for all secondary uses. Manipulation in this context, however,
is unlikely to become common. In most cases licensing is a revenue
generator for rightholders. When the cost of licensing exceeds
expected returns, rightholders would be motivated to engage in
licensing only in rare cases, where the cost of enlarging the pool of
fair uses under the subtle incentive theory, together with lost
licensing fees that derive from the lack of licensing offering in the
market is greater than the cost of maintaining an accessible and
efficient licensing choice. Even in those rare cases, rightholders
are likely to find manipulation to be more time-consuming and
expensive than engagement in licensing.
Point at Time: The court ought to direct the licensing
inquiry to the time when the user’s licensing attempt took place.
If, in the meantime, the rightholder initiated a missing licensing
system the result should remain the same. One can rightfully
argue, however, that if the purpose behind the licensing test is to
subtly incentivize licensing, once an accessible licensing choice
is offered there is no justification to favor a defendant in a fair
use analysis for the past nonexistence of a viable licensing
choice. Indeed, the ultimate aim of the licensing subtest is to
encourage licensing. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the
representation of licensing choices is susceptible to manipulations,
especially given the long-lasting nature of copyright litigation. To
increase their prospects of winning a case, rightholders might offer
a licensing choice as soon as they file a lawsuit or a short time
before. Also, rightholders would benefit from pinning the licensing
inquiry to a specific point in time, in the event that they choose to
discontinue a licensing choice which existed when the defendant
made her use. In those cases, the licensing subtest would be
against fair use, even though the licensing alternative is no longer
valid for similar uses in the future.
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V. THE SUBTLE INCENTIVE THEORY AND FAIRUSE
JUSTIFICATIONS
Legal commentary has offered many interpretations of
the fair use doctrine in an attempt to define the overarching
principles that guide the analysis.306 In this section, I review
three of the most prominent justifications for fair use, and
analyze their premises to spot potential conflicts with the subtle
incentive theory. Before commencing, it is vital to acknowledge
the difference between the following interpretations and the
subtle incentive theory. The subtle incentive theory, while
contemplating copyright objectives, is primarily dedicated to
encouraging licensing of preexisting works to secondary creators
or users. The views discussed below, however, are concerned
with recognizing the theoretical justifications for fair use as an
exception to the copyright monopoly. As such, to give grounds for
the fair use defense those views usually employ a macro
perspective that does not concern itself with one specific factor,
but rather permeates all or most of the factors. This discrepancy
would at some points make the subtle incentive theory look like
it opposes those justifications. However, bearing in mind that
the licensing inquiry is balanced with additional factors and
does not stand alone, the subtle incentive theory is generally in
tune with existing fair use interpretations.
In an oft-cited article, Judge Pierre Leval suggested that
fair use should apply only to a use that “serves the copyright
objective of stimulating productive thought and public
instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for
creativity.”307 In other words, according to Leval, the fair use
doctrine should maximize creative expression by looking at the
productivity of the secondary use and minimize harm by
securing the author’s incentive to create. Under this view, the
306 In addition to the three views I survey in the following pages, there are
other commentators who offered various theories of fair use. To name just a few:
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. AND MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1525 (2004) (arguing that “favored practices and patterns” should be
explicitly acknowledged in fair use analysis); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and
Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539
(2003) (fair use acts as a legitimate creative destruction of copyright markets that
challenges existing production and distribution models without undermining creation
incentives); Weinreb, supra note 304 (viewing fair use as an appeal for fairness, by
considering accepted norms and customary practice); Lunney, Fair Use, supra note 243
(claiming that fair use should balance the public benefits and losses derived from the
grant of a copyright monopoly to the rightholder).
307 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1110 (1990).
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four statutory factors encapsulate all the relevant considerations
to be calculated within a fair use analysis, and additional issues
(e.g., morality matters and artistic integrity) are false factors
“that divert the inquiry from the goals of copyright.”308 Since this
argument revolves around the secondary use—whether it is
sufficiently productive and transformative and whether it
excessively harms the market for the original—the subtle
incentive theory, which analyzes the ability of a would-be
creator to obtain a license in the market, is facially at odds with
Leval’s understanding of fair use.309
Nevertheless, the conflicting views can be reconciled to
some extent by looking at Judge Leval’s underlying argument:
copyright’s sole purpose is to promote the production and
dissemination of creative works, and fair use is “a necessary
part of the overall design.”310 The subtle incentive theory shares
this proposition, and by hoping to incentivize licensing through
the existing fair use factors instead of as its own determinative
factor, agrees that the secondary use must be sufficiently
creative, transformative, and socially productive. However,
against the backdrop of transaction costs in copyright reality,
focusing exclusively on the nature of the secondary use without
making allowances for existing licensing difficulties does not
truly follow copyright’s objective. Such a view is incomplete
because it acknowledges only three categories of secondary uses:
licensed (thus authorized), unauthorized (thus infringing), and
fair uses (unauthorized but sufficiently productive to justify the
expropriation of the owner’s right). There are many potential
uses that do not even get to the point of being classified as one
of those three groups because the secondary author chooses to
refrain from using the work due to the unavailability of an
accessible licensing choice.
In her seminal work, Professor Wendy Gordon presented
the market theory of fair use, which in a way complements Judge
Leval’s approach by appraising market failures that interfere
with consensual market transfers.311 Under this approach, an
unauthorized use of copyrighted works should be found fair
where: “(1) defendant could not appropriately purchase the
308 Id. at 1125.
309 Leval’s approach was criticized for being underinclusive. See, e.g., Weinreb,
supra note 304, at 1142 (arguing that the list of principles offered by Leval “would
neither reflect the full range of concerns embodied in the fair use doctrine nor would
they much increase the clarity and predictability of results in concrete cases”).
310 Leval, supra note 307, at 1110.
311 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 6, at 1615.
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desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the
use to defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the
copyright owner’s incentives would not be substantially impaired
by allowing the user to proceed . . . .”312 The first part of the test
prescribes a finding of fair use only when a market bargain is
impossible or difficult to obtain due to high transaction costs,
externalities, non-monetizable interest, noncommercial activities,
or anti-dissemination motives.313 The second part of the test
supports fair use when allowing the unauthorized use produces a
net gain in social value.314 Social value should be estimated with
the help of objective measures; a court should ask whether a
rightholder would have consented to the transfer had she and the
user bargained in a perfect market.315 If consent could be implied,
the use may qualify as fair use.316
The third element of the assessment safeguards
copyright’s incentive system by instructing courts not to award
fair use if doing so would weaken the incentives of the plaintiff
and similarly-situated copyright owners.317 By offering the third
part, Gordon acknowledges the differences between a complete
market failure and an “intermediate market failure,” where the
market successfully produces only a portion of all desirable
transfers.318 An intermediate market failure often occurs when a
new technology is introduced and a custom of nonpaid uses
develops due to the high costs associated with enforcing rights or
obtaining permission.319 In cases of intermediate market failure,
both enforcement and non-enforcement pose risks: enforcement
may prevent desirable exchanges while non-enforcement may
harm authors’ incentives.320 In her early work, Gordon designed
the third test to ensure that even if the unauthorized use would
have generated a net social benefit, no fair use could be found
where such a finding would substantially injure rightholders’
incentives.321 Later, Gordon conceded that the condition was
overly restrictive and that substantial injury should be treated
312 Id. at 1601.
313 Id. at 1628-33.
314 Id. at 1615-18.
315 Id. at 1614.
316 Id. at 1616-17.
317 Id. at 1614. The level of injury is judged on an absolute scale. Id. at 1619.
318 Id. at 1618.
319 Id.
320 Id. at 1618-19.
321 Id. at 1619. Accordingly, when a permission system is later offered an
unauthorized use is less likely to be found fair. Id.
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differently when considering different types of market failures.322
Consequently she distinguishes between two classes of market
failures: (1) “‘technical failures’ that prevent perfect competition[s]”
such as “endowment effects, high transaction costs between owner
and user, transaction costs that prevent a user from internalizing
the social benefit she generates, indivisible products, and strategic
behavior”;323 and (2) “market failures” that “address[ ] all the
normative reasons why we might not want to rely on the
market, such as dissatisfaction with the pursuit of economic
value.”324 In the former category the unauthorized use is
“excused” under the special circumstances of the particular use,
while in the latter a finding of fair use is “justified” on non-
economic grounds.325
The subtle incentive theory successfully passes Gordon’s
trifold test. In accordance with the market failure criterion, the
need to incentivize rightholders to offer licensing alternatives
arises only when no accessible, lawful choice exists and a
prospective user cannot obtain a license for her use. The second
criterion, which essentially looks at whether the use is more
valuable in the hands of the defendant or in the hands of the
rightholder, is more closely tied to the specific circumstances of
the use, and should be evaluated in every case based on the facts
at issue and the application of the four statutory fair use factors to
those facts. The third test appears to initially conflict with the
subtle incentive theory, as that test used to treat harm to
rightholders’ incentives as a trump card in all cases. Nevertheless,
even under the third test, some degree of injury to creators’
incentives is contemplated.326 Also, even though Gordon is less
likely to accept fair use treatment for uses that are excused (as
opposed to justified) when the rightholder suffers harm to her
incentive, she points out that “it is important to avoid exaggerating
the extent to which even ‘excuse’ cases will disappear.”327
Gordon rightly identifies that, where fair use is warranted
due to high transaction costs between owner and user,
322 Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 149, 154 (2003) [hereinafter Gordon, Excuse and Justification].
323 Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to




326 See also Leval’s view that “[t]he market impairment should not turn the
fourth factor unless it is reasonably substantial.” Leval, supra note 307, at 1125.
327 Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 322, at 190.
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technological and institutional changes that reduce those costs
should affect the availability of the fair use defense.328 The subtle
incentive theory follows the same rationale and is highly
responsive to changes in licensing markets. Most importantly,
under the subtle incentive theory, even if a finding of fair use may
harm creation incentives, it would not be binding on other
rightholders in the same or different markets if their works can
be efficiently licensed. The same finding would also be
inapplicable to the same rightholder if she subsequently
established an efficient licensing solution. By then, potential
injury to the incentives of the original rightholder, as well as
those of the secondary users wishing to build upon her work, are
virtually eliminated. In other words, if transaction costs are the
sole impediment to licensing (in the terms of Gordon, the
“excuse” class of fair uses),329 when rightholders act to minimize
those costs by being available and responsive to licensing
inquiries, the subtle incentive theory would not support a
finding of fair use. If, however, a rightholder refuses to license
due to a motivation unrelated to copyright objectives, such as
blocking criticism (in Gordon’s terms—the “justification” class
of fair uses),330 other considerations would tip the scale in favor
of the user and would deem her use fair even if an efficient
licensing system were available.
An additional theory of fair use by Professor William
Fisher suggests that fair use should be reconstructed via two
models, the first of which is based on economic analysis to
efficiently allocate scarce resources,331 and the second is a “good
life” model that aims to advance “a substantive conception of a
just and attractive intellectual culture” informed by “a vision of
the good life and the sort of society that would facilitate its
widespread realization.”332 Fisher acknowledges some weaknesses
in the economic model (e.g., its inability to satisfactorily deal with
endogenous changes in preferences),333 but still generally
subscribes to it. He is also cognizant of the flaws in the utopian
approach, which “trades precision for practicability in the
advancement of the good society.”334 Similarly to Gordon, Fisher
also puts emphasis on the harm caused by the unauthorized
328 Id. at 188-89.
329 Id.
330 Id.; see also Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 6, at 1643.
331 William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1698 (1988).
332 Id. at 1744.
333 Id. at 1736-39.
334 Id. at 1783.
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secondary use, advocating for an expansive definition of “harm”
including, any predictable adverse impact on the welfare of the
producers caused by depriving them of the right either to forbid
the activity in question or to charge persons who wish to
engage in it should be included.335 The last view could, in some
instances, be perceived as contradicting the subtle incentive
theory. Similarly to Gordon’s approach, however, Fisher leaves
room for the court’s discretion to grant fair use if the harm is
either insubstantial or would not significantly diminish the
quantity or quality of the rightholder’s output.336 Moreover,
Fisher’s vision of a utopian theory of fair use highlights the
importance of the public interest.337 The subtle incentive theory,
in this sense, speaks the same language, by being responsive to
the reality of licensing hurdles and wishing to facilitate lawful
secondary creation.
Other scholars also designated fair use to privileged
classes of specific uses either to encourage secondary creation
or to subsidize other important social, cultural, and political
interests.338 While there is no consensus as to which uses
should be part of the exemption list, fair use privileges were
proposed for scientific and educational research, uses that are
sufficiently transformative, uses that advance democratic
values, personal or private uses, noncommercial uses and
more.339 Being centered on considerations external to the
character of the use, the subtle incentive theory is neutral as to
these approaches to fair use.
CONCLUSION
The licensing shortage in copyright has long been
considered conducive to the initiation and maintenance of piracy,
as well as detrimental to further creation. Recognizing this
problem, legal scholarship has polarized into two competing
positions. The first calls for statutory licensing systems to allow
specific uses of copyrighted works in return for administratively-
prescribed fair fees, which, contrary to the proprietary nature of
copyright, does not leave the licensing choice in the hands of the
rightholder. The second approach objects to governmental
intervention and counts on the invisible hand of the market to
335 Id. at 1781.
336 Id. at 1781-82.
337 Id. at 1746.
338 Madison, supra note 306, at 1567-68.
339 Id.
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respond to licensing demand only when such reaction is necessary
through market-based solutions and self-help means to facilitate
efficient licensing or licensing bypasses.
This article advocates for a middle-ground approach by
propounding the subtle incentive theory of copyright licensing.
Under the subtle incentive theory, rightholders would be subtly
incentivized to engage in licensing their works if the lack of
licensing alternatives in the market for the copyrighted work is
considered within a fair use review. More specifically, courts have
already made allowances for the existence of licensing possibilities
to deny fair use when an efficient licensing scheme was in place.
Nevertheless, for nearly 18 years since the inclusion of the
licensing inquiry under the fourth factor of fair use analysis, courts
did not use the same rationale to support a finding of the fair use
when an accessible licensing choice did not exist. Courts have
started to move in this direction by partially considering the lack
of licensing in the market to support fair use as demonstrated in
two recent cases involving non-profit institutions copying works
for educational purposes. But those decisions do not offer a
comprehensive strategy for including licensing shortages in the
fourth factor, and also, importantly, reference the reasonableness
of the price as an indication without justifying or explaining the
application of such reference.
The subtle incentive theory offers a zero-cost doctrinal
change to alleviate copyright licensing difficulties. The subtle
incentive theory gives rightholders the liberty to choose to
license—it allows rightholders to avoid licensing if offering such
alternative makes no economic sense for them—while it
empowers them to possibly change the classification of future
uses from fair to unfair merely by offering a licensing choice.
Hence, it does not over-interfere with market dynamics, and it
avoids many of the problems associated with compulsory
licensing. The subtle incentive theory does not leave the
licensing failure to be repaired by the market alone, and it adds
an important policy statement as to the significance of original
and secondary creation alike.
